

Perceiving Bad Apples Versus Rotten Trees: Evidence From the Exposure of Politician Misbehavior in Colombia

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Abstract

This paper studies the effects of disclosing information about politician misbehavior on trust in public institutions. I use news bulletins from the main anti-corruption agency in Colombia announcing disciplinary prosecutions against municipal mayors. I exploit the timing of the bulletin's publication as a source of variation on the information about the mayor's misbehavior. Using a difference-in-difference framework, I find citizens show a sophisticated use of the information to judge public institutions. News of the prosecution led to increased trust in judicial institutions. However, the effects on confidence in the political system depend on whether citizens perceive the prosecuted mayor as an individual transgressor or as representative of political institutions that are persistently led by questionable individuals. In the former case, the bulletin's publication increased support for the political system. In the latter, it diminished trust in the elections, in political parties, in Congress, and reduced overall support for the political system. These findings highlight the spillover effects of an institution's performance on the public's confidence in other democratic institutions.

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1 Introduction

Holding politicians accountable for their misbehavior is recognized as essential for a well-functioning democracy. In theory improved information may enable citizens to better monitor public officials (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Prat, 2006; Prat and Strömberg, 2013). Indeed, evidence has shown that exposing corrupt politicians can enhance electoral accountability and reduce resource capture (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). However, this information may disenchant citizens with the electoral system, leading to lower voter turnout and a decreased vote for incumbent and challenger parties alike (Chong et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2004; de Figueiredo et al., 2012).

It is not clear whether this disenchantment effect could extend beyond electoral institutions. Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon (2015) argue that “once corruption reaches a certain level, voters may interpret it as an equilibrium from which individual politicians (...) cannot credibly withdraw” (p.1). Arguably this effect could also apply to other democratic institutions. These could be perceived as embroiled in the same corrupt environment as the exposed politician. Hence, the disclosure of corruption information may have negative spillover effects on their perceived trustworthiness. Alternatively, such information may be taken as evidence on the correct functioning of the system of checks and balances, in which case it could strengthen the public’s confidence in other democratic institutions.

Identifying the effect of disclosing corruption information on trust in institutions is empirically challenging. Often information about politicians’ performance is not randomly assigned to citizens (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). Instead, such knowledge typically depends on personal or community characteristics, such as individual interest in politics or communal levels of political engagement. These could also determine how harshly one judges the institutions. For instance, if communities with a more active citizenry are less tolerant of politicians who deviate from the correct behavior. Additionally, the direction of the causality is not clear *a priori*. Politicians’ misbehavior could be more frequently exposed in places where citizens’ distrust makes them more vigilant of their public servants. Alternatively, citizens’ trust in institutions may create a culture where politicians are compelled to abide by the law, and thus commit less irregularities that could be exposed.

To tackle this question, this paper studies the effect of exposing information about politician misbehavior on trust in public institutions in Colombia. For this purpose, it exploits plausibly exogenous variation provided by the timing of the publication of bulletins on disciplinary prosecutions against municipal mayors. The analysis uses a dataset originally

collected by [Martínez \(2019\)](#) from news bulletins published by the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia, *Procuraduría General de la Nación* (PGN). This is Colombia's main watchdog agency, which oversees the behavior of public servants countrywide. The bulletins are made publicly available on the PGN's website and mark the beginning of the disciplinary prosecution against the accused public official. The research design exploits the idiosyncratic timing of the publication of the first PGN bulletin available for each case of prosecution against a municipal mayor between 2011 and 2018. I then compare citizen's trust in a variety of public institutions across municipalities with a prosecuted mayor, versus those without it, before and after the publication of the bulletin in a difference-in-difference framework.

Importantly, most of the prosecutions in my sample are directed against previous mayors. This provides two main advantages. First, it allows me to test the effect of the information shock *per se* on trust in institutions. Potentially this could be confounded with the direct effect of the corrupt event on trust. Nonetheless, this is unlikely to be the case given that most of the alleged misbehavior occurred -if at all- years before the bulletin's publication. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, it allows me to test whether the effects of the bulletin varied according to the continuity of seemingly corrupt politicians in office. To account for this, I exploit the fact that former mayors -who are prosecuted- may have different degrees of proximity with the current administration. I use the political party of the prosecuted mayor as a proxy for this relationship. I then compare municipalities with and without a prosecuted mayor, conditional on whether the incumbent mayor is affiliated with the same political party that endorsed the prosecuted (former) mayor. This comparison captures the fact that the bulletin may have had a different effect depending on whether the public perceives the mayor as an isolated transgressor or as an example of political institutions that are persistently led by questionable individuals. Thus, it allows me to distinguish between citizens who might perceive the mayor as a 'bad apple' or as representative of a 'rotten tree'.

The data on trust in institutions comes from the 2012-2018 Americas Barometer Survey conducted in Colombia. This data has several advantageous features. First, it contains the date of the interview for each person, thus allowing me to define the treatment status at a daily level. Second, it distinguishes between trust in various local and national institutions, which enables me to test whether the performance of local politicians has an impact on other democratic structures, even at the national level. Third, out of the 47 municipalities included in each survey round, 45 of them remain constant across the years of study. This allows me to construct a balanced municipal-level panel with individual level data on trust.

Taking advantage of the panel structure, the preferred specification includes municipality and year fixed effects. The former account for time-invariant sources of heterogeneity in municipalities with and without prosecuted mayors (e.g. different levels of political engagement or citizen oversight), while the latter control for common shocks to all municipalities in a given year (e.g. national political scandals). Since the PGN has discretionary power to start an investigation, a potential concern is whether the timing of the bulletin's publication is capturing the effect of other municipal characteristics that could create differential trends in the evolution of citizens' trust. To address this possibility, I control for these time-varying municipal characteristics, such as population levels, municipal income, exposure to armed conflict attacks, and history of prosecuted mayors. I also cluster standard errors at the municipality level to account for the correlation of the error term within a municipality.

Additionally, to mitigate the concern that prosecutions are politically biased, I show that the probability of prosecution does not depend on the politician's popularity or his affiliation to certain political parties. Moreover, to support my empirical strategy, I provide qualitative evidence of the news coverage of disciplinary prosecutions following the bulletin's publication. I show news of the mayor's prosecution were divulged by various local, regional and national media outlets. Furthermore, the news circulated almost immediately after the bulletin's publication, thus plausibly suggesting that citizens had access to this information and could adjust their evaluations of institutions accordingly.

Results show that the publication of the bulletin had a negative albeit insignificant effect on trust in the mayors' office, which is consistent with individuals separating their perceptions of individual public officials from the institutions which they serve. Moreover, I find significant spillover effects on trust in other structures of the democratic system.

Indeed, results show the bulletin's publication had a significant and positive effect on trust in the justice system. This remains robust and unchanged even when the prosecuted mayor is affiliated with the current municipal administration. I argue this occurs because the watchdog's exposure of the mayor's irregular behavior exemplifies the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances. Thus, it reflects positively on judicial institutions which are also in charge of prosecuting wrongdoing. Since watchdog institutions are the ones denouncing the irregularities, they are not perceived as allies of the politicians, even if the same party remains in power. Therefore, the bulletin's publication increases citizens' trust in judicial institutions regardless of the continuity of seemingly dirty politicians in office.

Furthermore, I find that the effects on trust in the political system differ substantially according to the affiliation between the prosecuted mayor and the incumbent. The bulletin's

publication increases citizen's support of political institutions on average and in municipalities where the mayor's office is no longer controlled by the party that endorsed the prosecuted politician. In this case, the alleged transgressor's influence does not extend across mayoral terms, and thus he is likely perceived as an isolated 'bad apple'. Conversely, results show that when the incumbent mayor is associated with the prosecuted one, the former's exposure erodes trust in political institutions. In this scenario, the mayor's prosecution reflects negatively on the political system in which his allies are still in power. I argue this continued local governance by politicians associated to an alleged transgressor renders the PGN's prosecution as insufficient, because it fails to target other apples from a possibly 'rotten tree'. Thus, for these municipalities, the initially positive effect of the bulletin on trust in political institutions is reversed and -depending on the particular institution- becomes negative or statistically insignificant.

Overall, this paper demonstrates not only that the disclosure of information on politician misbehavior shapes trust in institutions, but also that citizens' interpretation of this information is sophisticated. Their judgement of institutions is conditional on their perception of the accused public official as an individual case or as part of a dirty political environment, one where his allies are still in power. Moreover, citizens develop different evaluations for political and judicial (watchdog) institutions according to their relationship with the prosecuted official. The former allow continuity in this individual's power and thus, in response to the bulletin's publication, are negatively judged by the public. The latter expose and prosecute the politician's wrongdoing, thus earning citizens' confidence.

These findings relate most closely to the political science literature on the effects of citizen's experiences and perceptions of corruption in shaping their trust in public institutions ([Anderson and Tverdova, 2003](#)). This literature has focused on corruption perception (measured individually or country-level) and personal experiences of corruption, and has documented negative partial correlations between these measures and confidence in public institutions, the legitimacy of the political system and trust in civil servants ([Bowler and Karp, 2004](#); [Caillier, 2010](#); [Clausen et al., 2011](#); [Morris and Klesner, 2010](#); [Seligson, 2002](#)). While our understanding of this relationship has improved, this literature has not addressed identification concerns such as reverse causality and omitted variable bias. This paper contributes to this debate by using a difference-in-difference framework to provide causal evidence for the case of Colombia. Importantly, instead of using corruption perceptions or individual reports of corruption experiences, I use an objective municipal-level measure.

Moreover, this paper focuses on the spillover effects of exposing misbehavior on different

types of institutions, a hypothesis that has received little attention in the existing literature. In doing so, it proposes a novel mechanism to explain these spillover effects. In particular, I argue that the effect of the information depends on the public's perception of the accused politician as an individual transgressor (bad apple) or as an example of a persistently corrupt environment (rotten tree).

This work also contributes to the growing literature on political corruption. Much of it has focused on the effect of disclosing corruption information on the responsiveness of governments and voter behavior (Banerjee et al., 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012; Malesky et al., 2012; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). This seems to be a double-edged sword, since some authors have found negative effects on voter turnout and diminished votes for both incumbents and challengers (Chong et al., 2015; de Figueiredo et al., 2012). Their results seem to indicate that exposing corruption may disenchant citizens with electoral institutions. I explore whether this disenchantment extends beyond these institutions and affects other political and judicial bodies, at the local and national level. I contribute to this literature by showing that exposing politician misbehavior does not necessarily erode confidence in all public institutions. In the case of Colombia, the exposure of misbehaving mayors by a watchdog agency actually leads to increased trust in the justice system. The diminished trust in political institutions is conditional on the proximity between the prosecuted politician and the incumbents.

Overall, my work shows that citizen's responses to information on politician misbehavior are more sophisticated than previously thought. In doing so, this paper also speaks to the broader literature on political accountability (for a review, see Ashworth (2012)). While my work does not study voter choice or the incentives these create for elected public officials, it does contribute to study the process by which voters attribute blame and credit to institutional actors in response to information about their performance (Berry and Howell, 2007; Pande, 2011; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010). Some of the literature on retrospective voting and blame attribution has cast doubts over citizen's abilities to properly evaluate politician's behavior, either due to lack of knowledge or to biases that affect their judgement (De Vries and Solaz, 2017; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). In contrast with this view, my findings are consistent with sociotropic models in which citizens perceive and respond to societal problems, such as corruption by local public officials (Klašnja et al., 2016). Moreover, I show that ordinary citizens can develop sophisticated responses to these concerns. Their evaluations not only distinguish between different types of institutional actors, they are also dependent on the proximity between each institution and the allegedly corrupt politician. Furthermore,

I provide evidence on how the formation of voter’s judgement is aided (rather than hindered) by heuristics (Kahneman, 2003), such as party endorsements that signal proximity between seemingly corrupt politicians. Since citizen’s don’t have complete information on the extent of the corruption in their municipality, they rely on observable characteristics (heuristic attributes) to simplify the complex task of evaluating their public institutions in response to information on politician misbehavior. Thus, I show that cognitive shortcuts act as a powerful driver of citizens’ response to information on political corruption.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the prosecutions by the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia. Section 3 introduces the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the main results and robustness checks. Additionally, it presents other heterogeneous effects according to individual characteristics. Section 5 concludes.

2 Background

Colombia is divided into 1102 municipalities. Each of these popularly elects a mayor to serve a four-year term without the possibility of reelection (Martínez, 2019). Mayors are the highest-ranking municipal authority. Like other public officials in Colombia, they are supervised by various watchdog central agencies. Among these, the Office of the Inspector General (PGN) oversees their compliance with the Constitution and the administrative law in the exercise of their public functions. For this purpose, it has the power to investigate and impose disciplinary sanctions. These include fines, suspensions from public service (which range from a few months to several years) and even the removal from office. To guarantee its independence, the PGN is not part of any branch of government and has administrative and fiscal autonomy (Función Pública, 2020). Also, even though it works as a centralized institution, it has several regional offices covering the whole country.

The PGN may start an investigation based on information obtained during its own inquiries or provided by other public agencies, the media, or ordinary citizens. If it identifies an irregular behavior and gathers enough evidence on its occurrence, it starts a disciplinary prosecution against the accused public servant. The prosecution starts with the publication of the statement of charges, which is communicated to the public through a news’ bulletin in the PGN’s website. The agency also publishes bulletins communicating summons to the court and rulings on the case. After their publication, PNG bulletins are widely shared by local and national media outlets. I collected qualitative evidence on the media coverage of

prosecutions announced in news bulletins from the watchdog agency. This is presented in section 3.

The PGN is a powerful institution. According to a report from the Electoral Observation Mission, *Misión de Observación Electoral*, between 2012 and 2016 the PGN removed 111 municipal mayors from office (RCN Radio, 2017). These along with 17 of the 32 departmental governors. In the past years, the deposed mayors have included powerful politicians, such as the mayors of Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, and Bucaramanga. As a consequence, a potential concern is whether the prosecutions are politically biased. Powerful politicians could interfere with the investigations, either manipulating the timing of their publication or pressuring the PGN to halt prosecutions against allies. However, section 3.3. shows the mayors' probability of being prosecuted is not correlated to his popularity nor to his affiliated political party. Overall, I find no evidence to indicate the PGN is not trustworthy. Hence, I argue that its prosecutions provide credible evidence on the correct performance of the system of checks and balances, in which watchdog agencies are constantly monitoring the behavior of local politicians and can hold them accountable.

3 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data Sources

The individual-level data on trust of public institutions comes from the Americas Barometer Survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This is a nationally representative survey based on interviews on a random sample of around 1500 adult individuals. I use the surveys from 2012 onwards because this is the first year in which the data contains the date of the survey for each person. This allows me to define the treatment status at a daily level. The surveys are conducted almost every year. For my sample this includes 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

From these surveys I have a potential sample of 7748 observations from 49 different municipalities. Nonetheless, between 2012 and 2018 only 45 of these municipalities are sampled every year, which is why I drop the 4 remaining municipalities to construct a balanced municipal-level panel. Removing these municipalities leaves me with 7501 potential observations.

The surveys ask respondents how much they trust a variety of local and national public institutions on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). These include the mayor's office, the elections, political parties, Congress, the President, courts of justice, the justice system,

the political system, and overall satisfaction with Colombian democracy. Table 1 (Panel A) shows the distribution of responses.

I combine this information with municipal level data on disciplinary prosecutions against local public officials, which can be interpreted as a measure of institutional performance. This dataset was compiled by Martínez (2019) and is based on the news bulletins published on the PGN’s website between 2004 and 2018 ¹. For each report, the dataset contains the date of publication, the names of the accused public servants, their municipality, their role in the administration, the charges, a short description of the events leading to the charges, the stage of the process and the decision reached in the ruling stage.

I construct a dummy variable indicating if the mayor of each municipality in the LAPOP survey was prosecuted by the watchdog agency up to a year before I observe the first survey in that municipality. I define this measure as the main treatment variable. To illustrate the variation I exploit, Figure 1 shows the percentage of municipalities with a prosecuted mayor during each quarter between 2011 and 2018. The first LAPOP interviews are conducted during the first quarter of 2012. By this time, around 30% of sample municipalities have a prosecuted mayor. This share increases up to 80% by the last quarter of 2018. Importantly, the PGN may start an investigation on both current and past mayors. As Table 2 shows, in sample municipalities the first prosecution against a mayor frequently involves one who governed during a previous term.

Additional information on municipal characteristics is taken from the *Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Económico* (CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. Their panel data contains information on demographic, governmental and conflict characteristics at the municipal level, which are collected from various government agencies. I use these to account for traits of municipalities that could explain different trends in the evolution of trust in institutions over time. Table 1 (panel B) provides summary statistics on such characteristics for sample municipalities.

3.2 Empirical Strategy

Identification concerns, such as reverse causality and omitted variable bias, could affect the estimation of the effect of disclosing corruption information on trust in institutions. Indeed, such information is often not randomly assigned, and citizens’ access to it may depend on their personal or community characteristics. Besides, as noted in the introduction, the

¹Originally Martínez (2019) recorded the news bulletins for prosecutions between 2004 and 2015. I extended the dataset up to 2018.

direction of the causality is not clear *a priori*. For instance, higher exposure of politician misbehavior may be more prevalent in places with a stronger tradition of citizen engagement in politics, who may have higher initial levels of trust in institutions.

To address these concerns, I use the timing of the publication of PGN’s bulletins communicating the prosecution of municipal mayors as a plausibly exogenous source of variation on information about politician misbehavior. I estimate the following two-way fixed effects regression for each individual i in municipality m responding to the survey at time (year) t :

$$y_{i,m,t} = \beta_1 \text{Bulletin}_{m,t} + \alpha_m + \delta_t + \gamma_m \times \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,m,t} \quad (1)$$

where $y_{i,m,t}$ is an individual-level measure of trust in public institutions. $\text{Bulletin}_{m,t}$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Thus β_1 captures the effect of disclosing information about politician misbehavior on the individual-level outcomes. All regressions include municipality fixed effects (α_m) and year fixed effects (δ_t). The former account for time-invariant heterogeneity across municipalities that may affect their citizens’ reported level of trust in institutions (e.g. different levels of citizen oversight). The latter control for unobserved time-varying factors that affect all municipalities simultaneously (e.g. prosecutions against national politicians).

γ_m is a vector of additional controls interacted with time fixed effects that allows flexible differential trends in citizen’s trust according to fixed municipal characteristics. As shown in Table 3, treated municipalities have lower populations levels and higher municipal income than non-treated municipalities. This could confound the results if citizens’ trust evolves differently over time according to these characteristics. For instance, the quality of public services or citizen’s proximity to public servants could evolve differently in richer or larger municipalities, and thus over time could create differential trends of institutional trust. To account for this possibility, in the baseline specification γ_m includes initial population and initial municipal income. As a robustness check, I include additional variables interacted with year fixed effects, such as average attacks from armed conflict actors between 2000 and 2010 (which also differs across treated and non-treated units), and total prosecuted mayors between 2004 and 2010. These could also confound the results if over time the de-escalation of armed conflict or recurrent exposure to misbehaving public servants affects institutional trust differentially in treatment municipalities. Finally, all regressions include standard errors clustered at the municipality level to account for the temporal correlation of errors between people in the same municipality.

The identification assumption is that, absent the exposure of the mayor’s prosecution, there would have been no relative change in citizen’s institutional trust in municipalities that have prosecuted mayors. Following [Muñoz et al. \(2020\)](#), this exclusion restriction implies that “the timing of the survey interview does not affect the outcome through any other channel except for the event of interest” (p.7). A potential concern is whether the timing of the bulletin’s publication is correlated to other municipal characteristics. For instance, if the PGN’s prosecutions are politically motivated and prone to be manipulated by local authorities. In this case, powerful politicians could affect the timing of the bulletin’s publication in order to minimize (or maximize) its damage to the prosecuted mayor’s popularity. This could result in a problem of endogenous timing, in which assignment to treatment and control groups is correlated to other municipal characteristics that could also influence citizen’s evaluation of public institutions. Likewise, the possible political bias in the watchdog’s prosecutions could lead to a scenario where incumbents can prevent investigations from coming into light. Censorship could be damaging to the identification strategy if it leads to selection bias, where a non-observable variable (such as the incumbent’s power) determines which municipalities have PGN bulletins and also affects trust in institutions.

However, my regression framework captures any persistent municipal traits that could explain the bulletin’s timing, as well as temporal trends that differentially affected municipalities of different size, income level, exposure to armed conflict, and history of misbehaving mayors. Moreover, if prosecutions were politically biased and led to a problem of endogenous timing or selection bias, treated municipalities would likely display a different evolution in their institutional trust before the bulletin’s publication. Section 3.3. further checks for pre-trends not captured by the fixed effects or by the time-varying municipal controls, and finds no evidence suggesting they affect the identification strategy. Thus non-observable variables, such as those related to political bias in prosecutions, would need to change discontinuously with the bulletin’s publication in order to affect the causality of my estimates. As shown below, I corroborate this with a number of robustness tests that explore whether the probability of being prosecuted by the PGN depends on the mayor’s popularity (as measured by his margin of victory in the elections) or affiliation to a particular political party. None of these predict the prosecution. I also show that overall the bulletin’s effects are not heterogeneous according to the mayor’s popularity, which further alleviates concerns that powerful incumbent or former politicians are manipulating the bulletin’s timing.

Another potential concern is whether the effect of the information disclosure is being confounded with the direct effect of the corrupt event on institutional trust. However,

my setup overcomes this problem by focusing almost exclusively on the exposure of past instances of politician misbehavior. Indeed, as shown in table 2, only 6 of the 37 alleged irregularities committed by mayors of LAPOP municipalities occurred during the sample period. Moreover, among these, only respondents in two municipalities are interviewed when the prosecuted mayor is still in office. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the results are driven by the direct impact of the corrupt event on trust in institutions.

Besides the exclusion restriction, another key identification assumption is that individual potential outcomes must be independent from the moment of the interview (Muñoz et al., 2020). In my framework, this ignorability assumption is plausibly satisfied due to the random nature of the LAPOP surveys and ordinary citizens' lack of knowledge to predict the date of the bulletin's publication. Indeed, even if the bulletin's timing was known to some public servants, it is highly unlikely citizens were aware of the inner workings of watchdog agency such as to foresee the date of the publication and to sort themselves into treatment or control groups in accordance to it. Moreover, as shown in section 4, my results are robust to the inclusion of individual-level covariates that could account for differences in reachability during the survey (such as age, sex, education and wealth). Overall, it is unlikely that respondents' have a non-random probability of being interviewed before or after the event.

Although the comparison across time of citizens in treatment and non-treatment municipalities captures the average impact of the bulletin on trust in public institutions, it does not capture the fact that the effect of the exposure of the mayor's misbehavior will likely depend on whether the public perceives the mayor as an isolated transgressor (a 'bad apple') or as representative of political institutions that are persistently led by questionable individuals (a 'rotten tree'). To account for this, I take advantage of the fact that most prosecutions in my sample are directed against previous mayors, who may have different degrees of proximity with the current administration. I use the prosecuted mayor's political party as a proxy for this relationship. I define the variable $SameParty_{m,t}$ as a dummy that equals one if the party affiliated with the prosecuted mayor is the incumbent at time t under the government of a mayor different from the prosecuted one. The continued governance by politicians affiliated with misbehaving mayors could deepen citizen's disenchantment with their political institutions, since the latter seem to be persistently affiliated with questionable individuals. To explore this possibility, I estimate the following regression model:

$$y_{i,m,t} = \beta_1 Bulletin_{m,t} + \beta_2 Bulletin_{m,t} \times SameParty_{m,t} + \alpha_m + \delta_t + \gamma_m \times \delta_t + \mu_p + \epsilon_{i,m,t} \quad (2)$$

β_2 captures the differential effect of the bulletin's publication in municipalities where there

is continuity between the prosecuted mayor and the current one. This specification includes the same set of fixed effects and time-varying controls as equation (1). Standard errors are similarly clustered at the municipality level. Additionally, I include ruling party fixed effects (μ_p) based on the political party that is the incumbent in the mayor’s office at time t . These effects account for persistent characteristics of political parties that could affect their general perception as being more or less corrupt in the public’s eye².

3.3 Exogenous Timing and Media Coverage

Although the parallel-trends assumption is essentially untestable, I provide evidence of its validity by showing there are no differential trends in treated versus non-treated municipalities before the publication of the bulletin. In order to do this, I estimate the following event study specification. This captures the change in citizens’ trust in public institutions at each point in time. For this purpose, I use the following specification:

$$y_{i,m,t} = \sum_{\tau \neq -1} \theta_{\tau} \text{Bulletin}_{m,t} \times \tau_{\tau} + \alpha_m + \delta_t + \gamma_m \times \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,j,t} \quad (3)$$

where τ_{τ} are the full set of time dummies that equal 1 for each year τ . The coefficient θ_{τ} captures the effect of the bulletin’s publication in the outcomes of interest in year τ relative to the year just before the publication. This regression also includes the baseline set of fixed effects and time-varying controls as defined in equation (1).

Figure 2 shows the coefficients on period dummies during a window of three years before and after the event. The figures do not reveal a change in any kind of institutional trust before the bulletin’s publication. Support for Colombia’s political system (Figure 2a) and trust in the fairness of the courts of justice (Figure 2d) seem to pick up within the first year of the bulletin’s publication. Meanwhile, trust in the justice system (Figure 2c) and feeling pride in the Colombian political system (Figure 2b) start to be positive and significant a year after the event. Although the change in this latter variable disappears in period 2, it does remain positive and significant for both measures of trust in the judicial institutions and support of the political system. The lack of significant changes in the outcomes of interest before the bulletin’s publication supports the validity of the parallel trends assumption.

To provide further evidence on the bulletin’s exogenous timing, I tested whether in sample municipalities mayors who governed between 2004 and 2019 had a different probability of

²To define the ruling party fixed effects I constructed individual dummies for the 10 main political parties in the sample. I then grouped the remaining parties in a residual category.

being prosecuted according to their popularity or their affiliation to certain political parties. Arguably, popularity is correlated to the strength of the mayor’s governance and his ability to influence other public institutions. As a proxy for this, I use the mayor’s margin of victory in local elections, and define dummies indicating whether their margin of victory was above the sample median or above the sample’s 75th percentile. Table 4 shows that the correlation between the probability of prosecution and the politician’s popularity is consistently negative but always statistically insignificant. Hence, more powerful mayors do not seem capable of censoring the watchdog’s prosecutions. Similarly, table 5 shows that allegiance to the main political parties in the sample does not influence the probability of prosecution. Overall, these results corroborate the reliability of the PGN’s prosecutions, which do not seem to be politically biased and thus have a plausibly exogenous timing.

Finally, in order to support the credibility of my identification strategy, I collected qualitative evidence of the media coverage of disciplinary prosecutions following the bulletin’s publication. Table A8 summarises these findings for sample municipalities. Prosecutions are covered by a variety of local, regional and national media³, in formats including newspapers, radio and television. Moreover, as shown by the publication dates of the media articles, the vast majority of news are published the same day in which the PGN announces its prosecution through a bulletin on its website. This suggests news of the prosecutions are immediately divulged by the media in sample municipalities. Even though I cannot directly test whether surveyed individuals knew about the prosecutions, this evidence shows its plausible they were common knowledge in treated places. Thus, it supports the validity of my identification strategy, in which access to information on the politician’s misbehavior leads citizens to reevaluate their trust in institutions.

4 Results

4.1 Main Effects on Trust in Public Institutions

Table 6 presents the estimates of equation (1) and equation (2) in three initial measures of trust in political institutions. Panel A presents the effects on trust in the mayor’s office,

³Prominent national media include written press, like El Tiempo, El Espectador, El Nuevo Siglo and Revista Semana, besides radio stations such as Caracol Radio and RCN Radio. Depending on the municipality’s location, bulletins are also covered by regional press, such as newspapers El Heraldo (in the Caribbean coast), Vanguardia (in Colombia’s northeaster region) or El País (in western departments). In smaller municipalities news of the prosecution are divulged by local media. Some examples of this are Noticias Día a Día (which covers news from Cundinamarca department) or San Vicente Radio (a radio station based in San Vicente de Chucurí, Santander).

while panel B and C use support in the Colombian political system and feeling pride in living under the Colombian political system (respectively). All panels in this section follow the same structure. Columns 1-3 present the estimates of equation (1). Column 1 uses the baseline specification, including initial population and initial municipal income as time-varying controls. Column 2 includes as additional controls average exposure to violence and aggregate number of investigated mayors during the pre-period, both interacted with year fixed effects. Column 3 is the same as column 2 but adds ruling party fixed effects. Column 4-6 present the estimates of equation (2). They replicate the specifications of the initial three columns adding the interaction term between $\text{Bulletin}_{m,t} \times \text{Same Party}_{m,t}$.

Overall, the estimates in Panel A show that the publication of the bulletin has a negative albeit insignificant effect on trust in the mayor's office. Columns 1-3 show this average negative effect is consistent across all specifications. Columns 4-6 show there is an additional negative effect of the bulletin's publication when the incumbent party is affiliated with the prosecuted mayor. Nonetheless, the exposure of the mayor does not appear to significantly change people's belief in his office.

Panel B and C show results for more general measures of trust in political institutions. On average, the bulletin's publication shows a positive and significant effect on support for the Colombian political system and feeling pride in living under this system (columns 1-3). Under the most stringent specification (column 3), estimates indicate that news of the mayor's prosecution led to a 0.447 unit increase in support of the political system and 0.227 unit increase in feeling proud of it. These are sizable increases, equivalent to 10.2% of the sample mean of support for the political system and 6% increase in feeling proud of it. They are also quite precise and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.

Nonetheless, once I let the effect of the bulletin vary according to the affiliation between the incumbent party in the mayor's office and the prosecuted mayor, I find that being governed by the party that endorsed the accused mayor has a diminishing effect on both measures of trust in the political system. For municipalities governed by a non-affiliated party, the coefficient of the bulletin's average effect remains roughly the same and statistically significant across specifications. However, the interaction term is consistently negative and also highly significant. Under the baseline specifications, the interaction coefficients show a 13% decrease in support of the political system and 8% decrease in feeling proud of it (column 4 in Panels A and B). Both are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. These marginal effects are even large enough to reverse the bulletin's initially positive effects on both variables.

Table 7 shows the baseline estimation of equations (1) and (2) using as outcomes two measures of confidence in judicial institutions. Panel A shows the bulletin’s average effect on trust in the justice system (columns 1-3). Across all specifications, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. With the full set of controls estimates indicate a 0.294 unit increase, equivalent to 8.5% of the variable’s sample mean. In line with this, Panel B shows a positive and statistically significant increase of roughly 7% in citizen’s trust in the fairness of the courts (column 3).

Unlike the case of the political system, columns 4-6 show the increased trust in judicial institutions is not reversed if the municipality is governed by a party affiliated with the prosecuted mayor. Initially, this marginal effect appears to be negative for both variables (columns 4-5), but only statistically significant when adding additional time-varying controls. Nonetheless, once party fixed effects are introduced, the interaction coefficients become positive and revert to being statistically insignificant. These results indicate that the differential effect according to the former mayor’s affiliation with the incumbent party does not overturn the initially positive effect of the bulletin’s publication on trust in judicial institutions, which did occur with their political counterparts. Indeed, even in the most stringent specification (column 6 of both panels), the bulletin’s overall effect on both measures of confidence in judicial institutions remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.

Table 8 explores whether the effects of the bulletin’s publication extend towards confidence in electoral and national-level political institutions. Initially, the average effect of disclosing news about the prosecution appears to be positive but only statistically significant for trust in Congress (Panel C). Nonetheless, once I include the interaction term, I find that respondents in municipalities governed by a party affiliated with the prosecuted mayor have a negative and statistically significant marginal effect on their trust in political parties (Panel A), the elections (Panel B) and Congress (Panel C). This is consistent across all specifications. The differential effect is also initially negative and statistically significant for trust in the President (Panel D, columns 4-5), however this is not robust to the addition of ruling party fixed effects.

These negative marginal effects are particularly strong and precise for trust in political parties and in the elections. Their estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level even under the most demanding specification (column 6). Moreover, for all outcomes, the overall effect of the bulletin’s publication is negative once the interaction term is accounted for. Baseline estimates show overall reductions of 9% in trust in political parties, 12% in the elections and 6% in Congress (column 4 in Panels A, B and C, respectively). These are

all statistically significant at least at the 5% level. This reduction is specially prominent for trust in political parties, in which even in the most stringent specification (column 6) the sum of both coefficients is statistically significant at the 10% level and accounts for a reduction in 7.4% of the variable's sample mean.

Finally, Table 9 analyzes whether the bulletin's publication affects overall satisfaction with the Colombian democracy. Columns 1-3 show the bulletin's publication has on average a positive but statistically insignificant effect on this variable. Initially, the introduction of the interaction effect yields a negative and significant marginal effect for people living in a municipality whose ruling party has ties with the prosecuted mayor. Nonetheless, this effect disappears once the party fixed effects are introduced. Overall, I find no consistent effects of disclosing news of the prosecution on general satisfaction with the Colombian democracy.

These results provide compelling evidence that the bulletin's publication has a causal effect on citizen's trust in public institutions. While on average the disclosure of the mayor's prosecution increases overall trust in judicial institutions and support for the political system, these effects are heterogeneous according to the affiliation between the incumbent party in the municipality and the prosecuted mayor. This differential effect is negligible in the case of trust in judicial institutions. However, it is large, negative and statistically significant for trust in multiple political institutions.

These findings suggest citizens' evaluation of institutions in response to the exposure of corruption information is sophisticated. On one side, the news of the investigation by the watchdog agency reflects positively on institutions in charge of maintaining law and order, such as the justice system and the courts of justice. The judiciary, together with watchdog agencies such as the PGN, are important counterweights to the executive power at the national and local level. Thus, evidence on the proper functioning of the anti-corruption agency, exemplified by its prosecution of powerful local politicians, reflects positively on judicial institutions that also expose and prosecute wrongdoing. Additionally, by prosecuting the mayor the PGN may signal its autonomy from other local politicians, such as members of the mayor's political party. If anything, in the public's eye their relationship may be of opponents and not of allies. Thus, the continued governance by a party affiliated with the prosecuted mayor does not affect the positive and statistically significant effect of the bulletin's publication on trust in the judiciary.

On the other side, news of the prosecution reflect negatively on political institutions if they are perceived to be allies of the misbehaving mayor. Arguably, the affiliation between the incumbent party and the accused mayor signals there is continuity between them. Thus,

when confronted with news of the mayor’s misbehavior, the continued governance of politicians close to him deepens the public’s distrust for political institutions in general. These, at least in their municipality, seem to be presently and persistently dominated by questionable individuals.

Following the argument of [Chong et al. 2015](#), when the prosecuted mayor’s influence extends across mayoral periods, the public may perceive the political environment as an equilibrium from which individual institutions cannot credibly withdraw. In this case, the average citizen no longer perceives ‘bad apples’, he perceives a ‘rotten tree’. When this happens, the PGN’s prosecution seems insufficient to cleanse the political environment, because it fails to target other political actors that are associated with the prosecuted mayor and may still be committing irregularities. Thus, in municipalities where the mayor’s allies are still in power, the initially positive effect of the bulletin on trust in political institutions is reversed. Overall, the bulletin’s effect becomes negative and statistically significant for trust in electoral institutions, such as political parties and the elections. The negative spillover effects even extend towards citizen’s confidence in the National Congress. General support for the political system and feeling pride in living under it also experience a negative effect, although overall this is statistically insignificant.

Conversely, in municipalities where the prosecuted mayor is not related to the incumbent, the positive estimates of the bulletin’s publication remain robust and stable across specifications. These are also economically meaningful. They account for an 11% increase in support for the political system and 8% increase in feeling pride in living under it (column 6, table 6, panels B and C). In their case, since the mayor’s influence does not visibly extend across mayoral terms, the watchdog’s prosecution seems like a credible way of getting rid of political corruption in their municipality.

I further test the robustness of these results by running regressions of equations (1) and (2) excluding (progressively) each municipality from the sample. For these exercises I use the baseline specification for each regression, shown in columns 1 and 4 of tables 6-9. Figures A1 and A2 show the results are not driven by respondents in any single municipality. Figures A1a-A1c show the average effect of the bulletin’s publication is always positive for trust in judicial institutions and support for the political system. Moreover, figures A2a and A2b indicate this increased confidence in the judiciary remains robust regardless of the affiliation between the incumbent party in the mayor’s office and the prosecuted mayor. Nonetheless, figures A2c-A2f show this affiliation does have a negative and consistently significant effect on citizen’s confidence in several political institutions.

Results are also robust to the inclusion of individual-level controls that could affect citizen’s evaluation of institutions. Tables A1- A4 show estimates remain roughly unchanged when controlling for the respondent’s sex, level of education, age and wealth⁴, in addition to the set of municipal controls used in previous tables.

Finally, in order to further explore the possibility of political bias in PGN’s prosecutions, I estimate whether the bulletin’s average effect is heterogeneous according to the popularity of the incumbent mayor. If powerful mayors were indeed capable of manipulating the timing of PGN prosecutions, then the bulletin’s publication would probably have a different effect in municipalities with powerful incumbents than in those with less popular mayors. The mayor’s margin of victory is taken as a proxy for his popularity. I classify treated municipalities into the high margin of victory category if their mayor won the elections with a margin of victory above the sample’s 75th percentile. Else, treated municipalities are classified in the low margin of victory group. Table A5 shows the results of this exercise. Although in general the effects appear to be larger in places with more popular incumbent mayors, the difference between both groups is only statistically significant at the 10% significance level in the case of trust in the justice system. Similarly, table A6 explores whether the average effects of the bulletin differ according to the popularity of the prosecuted politician. In this case, the effects appear to be larger in municipalities with less popular prosecuted mayors. However, the difference between the effects is only statistically significant in the case of trust in the courts’ fairness. Again, this is only significant at the 10% level. Overall, I find no conclusive evidence that indicates my results are influenced by the manipulation of PGN prosecutions by powerful politicians.

4.2 Heterogeneous Effects

This section investigates whether the average effects of the bulletin’s publication on institutional trust are heterogeneous according to individual characteristics. I start with the exploration of a possible mechanism at play. Previous studies have found that the effect of exposing corruption information depends largely on the presence of mass media to divulge the news (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Chang et al., 2010; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). These studies have relied on municipal-level data of media presence. However, this measure lacks

⁴Individual-level covariates are constructed in the following way: i) Sex is a dummy that equals one for respondents who identify as women. ii) Level of education corresponds to the individual’s highest level of education, which can be none, primary, secondary, or tertiary. iii) Age corresponds to age quartiles. iiii) Wealth is measured through the number of assets owned by the household from the following list: Television, fridge, landline phone, cellphone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, running water, bathroom, and computer. Respondents are then classified into quartiles according to their number of assets.

precision because it does not capture the variation in citizen’s knowledge of current affairs within a municipality. Indeed, even with the presence of mass media, there is likely to be significant local variation in how well informed citizens are. I take advantage of this variation to explore whether the bulletin’s effects are larger for people who follow the news more frequently ⁵. Since it is unlikely that the average citizen checks the PGN’s website, the effects of the bulletin’s publication depend on whether people learn about the mayor’s prosecution from the media.

To examine this possible channel, Table 10 investigates if the bulletin’s effects differ according to individual exposure to the news reported by the media. For this I use a question in the LAPOP survey inquiring how often the respondent follows the news, whether on television, radio, newspapers, or the internet. Results show the positive effects on institutional trust are larger for people who follow the news daily relative to people who follow them a few times a month or never (grouped under the label seldom follow the news). Indeed, the point estimates of trust in the justice system, the fairness of the courts and support for the political system are larger for this group of respondents (columns 1-3). Nonetheless, this difference is only statistically significant for support of the political system.

A possible concern is whether individual viewership of the news is endogenously affected by the bulletin’s publication. Indeed, citizens may increase the frequency in their news’ following in response to notable developments, such as the municipal mayor’s prosecution. Therefore, the previous results could indicate people react to the bulletin by increasing their following of the news, which in turn strengthens their positive reaction to the bulletin’s publication. Nonetheless, Table A7 tests this hypothesis and finds no evidence on this being the case. The bulletin’s publication has a negative albeit insignificant effect on the probability that the respondent follows the news daily. Thus, it is unlikely that the bulletins are causing increased media attention for some people.

Regarding other socio-demographic characteristics, the literature on political engagement has shown a positive correlation between individual resources, such as wealth, time, knowledge or social contacts, and more active political participation (Cook et al., 2014). This translates into higher rates of voting, contacting public officials or contributing to political campaigns. However, the relationship between such resources and trust in institutions seems to be less clear-cut. Research in industrialized democracies has found positive but weak correlation between these variables (Christensen and Lægveid, 2005). In Latin America, some

⁵Unfortunately, municipal-level data of media penetration in Colombia is not reliable. Thus, I cannot test whether the bulletin’s effects on trust in institutions are heterogeneous according to the presence of mass media in the municipality.

studies have even found the opposite: poorer citizens report greater trust in government institutions (Espinal et al., 2006; Turner and Martz, 1997). These authors interpret this relationship as a reflection of the dependency of poorer citizens on the state. Often, governments in these countries develop clientelistic relations with the poorer segments of society, who consequently end up relying more on them than wealthier citizens. Moreover, authors argue this is accompanied by greater cynicism from more educated and affluent citizens, who may better understand the limitations of institutions and thus become disenchanted with them.

In order to examine the relationship between resources and trust in public institutions, Table 11 examines whether the effects of disclosing the mayor’s misbehavior differ according to the respondent’s level of education (Panel A). Overall, the magnitude of the effects appears to be larger for people with education up to a secondary level (grouped under the label basic education). Indeed, columns 1-4 show the increased trust in the political and justice systems is larger for people with basic education. Relative to the outcome’s sample mean, for this demographic column 3 indicates roughly a 10% increase in support for the political system and column 4 shows a 7% increase in feeling proud of living under this system. Also for this group, columns 1 and 2 show a 6% and 5% increase in trust in the justice system and the courts of justice, respectively. These estimates are at least twice as large than those of people with tertiary education, for whom the bulletin even has a negative effect in feeling proud of the political system and trusting the justice system.

In line with these results, column 5 shows the bulletin’s publication led to a 0.298 unit decrease in trust in the mayor’s office for people with tertiary education, equivalent to an 8.3% decrease relative to the variable’s sample mean. For people with basic education this effect only accounts for a 0.1 unit decrease, which is not statistically significant. Likewise, for people with tertiary education, the bulletin led to a larger decrease in trust in Congress and trust in the President than for less educated people. With all these variables the difference between the estimates of both groups of respondents is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Panel B in Table 11 shows similar patterns of heterogeneity according to the number of assets owned by the respondent’s household⁶. This is taken as a proxy for individual wealth. I add up the total number of assets for each person and classify them in the low assets category if they own less than the sample median number of assets. Else, they are

⁶To calculate the level of assets I add the total number of assets owned by the respondent’s household from the following list: Television, fridge, landline phone, cellphone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, running water, bathroom, and computer.

classified in the high assets category. In line with previous results, estimates for respondents with a lower level of assets are larger than for richer people. For individuals with less assets, the bulletin's publication led to roughly an 11% increase in support of the political system, 8% increase in feeling proud of this system, 7% increase in trust in the justice system and 6% increase in trusting that the courts guarantee a fair trial. Again, these estimates are at least twice as large than those of people with more assets, and differences between them are significant at the 1% confidence level.

These heterogeneous effects consistently indicate that the bulletin's average positive effect on trust in political and justice institutions is concentrated among poorer and less educated people. This relationship is in line with other literature on other Latin American countries (Espinal et al., 2006; Turner and Martz, 1997). As explained before, if less privileged citizens have a more dependent relationship with the state, then they might be inclined to update their beliefs more positively when presented with evidence on the correct functioning of institutions. Additionally, if more affluent citizens are indeed cynics, the PGN's prosecution might reaffirm their distrust of government instead of causing them to reevaluate this assessment.

Another conjecture is that poorer individuals are more likely to be excluded from powerful institutions, which they could perceive as working in the interests of the few who dominate them. Therefore, with the news of the mayor's investigation, they are confronted with the fact that institutions such as the PGN do challenge the powerful and hold them accountable for their wrongdoing. Thus, the bulletin's publication has a larger positive effect on restoring their trust in various institutions, given their possible priors that these institutions were captured by an elite.

5 Concluding Remarks

I study the effect of exposing information about politician misbehavior on trust in public institutions in Colombia. For this purpose, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation on this information provided by the publication of bulletins announcing disciplinary prosecutions against municipal mayors. I find consistent evidence that on average the bulletin's publication had a positive and significant effect of the bulletin's publication on trust in judicial institutions and support of the political system.

However, the positive effects on trust in the political system depend on citizens' perception of the accused public official as an individual transgressor ('bad apple') or as part of

a dirty political environment, one where his allies are still in power ('rotten tree'). In the former case, the bulletin's publication increases overall support of political institutions. In the latter, it diminishes confidence in a variety of electoral and national-level political bodies. Interestingly, this heterogeneity does not apply to trust in the justice system. Since the watchdog's prosecution exemplifies the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances, it reflects positively on judicial institutions (also in charge of prosecuting wrongdoing) regardless of the relation between the incumbent politicians and the prosecuted one.

These findings evidence a more nuanced relationship between the exposure of information on politician misbehavior and citizen's subsequent judgement of it. Increasingly, the literature in political corruption has found this information could lead to citizen's disenchantment with the electoral system (Chong et al., 2015; de Figueiredo et al., 2012). Nonetheless, this paper shows the effects depend on whether the public perceives that exposure is enough to weed out the corrupt public officials. Moreover, contrary to recent work on retrospective voting (De Vries and Solaz, 2017; Healy and Malhotra, 2013), I show that ordinary citizens can develop sophisticated judgements when informed about the behavior of institutional actors. In their process of blame attribution citizens distinguish between different types of public bodies and take into account their proximity to the corrupt officials. Furthermore, when confronted with the complex task of evaluating the extent of the corrupt politician's influence, they are aided by heuristics such as party endorsements.

Finally, these results raise other interesting questions. Future research could explore whether these effects prevail if the exposure of the politician's misbehavior is done by the media or other whistle-blowers, not by watchdog agencies. Additionally, the effects of increased or diminished citizen trust on institutional performance are yet to be explored. Particularly in the case of public bodies that require active citizen collaboration (such as the judiciary), changes in trust might prove decisive for their effectiveness.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max
<i>Panel A. Main Outcomes</i>								
Trust in mayor's office	7,359	3.67	1.84	1	2	4	5	7
Trust in political parties	7,351	2.61	1.56	1	1	2	4	7
Trust in the elections	7,372	3.35	1.75	1	2	3	5	7
Trust in Congress	7,188	3.38	1.69	1	2	3	5	7
Trust in the President	7,415	3.68	2.01	1	2	4	5	7
Supports the political system	7,301	4.34	1.86	1	3	4	6	7
Feels pride in the political system	7,383	4.01	1.83	1	3	4	5	7
Trust in the justice system	7,377	3.56	1.74	1	2	4	5	7
Trusts the courts are fair	7,236	3.42	1.55	1	2	3	4	7
Satisfaction with democracy	6,472	2.22	0.727	1	2	2	3	4
<i>Panel B. Municipal Controls (Pre-2011)</i>								
Population	45	458,372.00	1,166,205.00	6,063	34,186	119,849	388,490	7,363,782
Share of rural population	45	0.268	0.249	0.002	0.057	0.144	0.481	0.885
Pre-period prosecution of mayors	45	0.889	1	0	0	1	2	4
Municipal Income	45	428,211.00	1,243,450.00	5,822.00	17,875.00	70,472.00	312,422.00	7,843,649.00
Transfers from central government	45	4,114.00	14,211.00	0	602	840	1,302.00	85,904.00
Yearly armed conflict attacks	45	16	25	0.091	1.82	4.18	18.9	113
<i>Panel C. Individual Characteristics</i>								
No education	7,403	0.02	0.14	0	0	0	0	1
Primary Education	7,403	0.205	0.403	0	0	0	0	1
Secondary Education	7,403	0.517	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Tertiary Education	7,403	0.258	0.438	0	0	0	1	1
Number of household assets	7,501	6.77	2.2	0	5	7	9	11
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Follows the news daily})$	7,456	0.673	0.469	0	0	1	1	1

Notes: The units of observation are as follows: Panel A, individual-municipality-year; Panel B, municipality; Panel C, individual-municipality-year. Municipal income and transfers from the central government are expressed in millions (COP). Population, share of rural population, municipal income and transfers from central government are from year 2010. Pre-period prosecution of mayors indicates the total number of prosecuted mayors per municipality between 2004-2010. Yearly armed conflict attacks are averaged between 2000-2010 for each municipality. No education, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education indicate the highest education level achieved by the individual. Number of household assets adds the total number of assets owned by the respondent's household from the following list: Television, fridge, landline phone, cellphone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, running water, bathroom, and computer. Follows the news daily is a dummy that excludes respondents who follow the news once a week, once a month, or never.

Table 2: Term Limits of Prosecuted Mayors in Sample Municipalities

Term Limits	Number of mayors
2004 - 2007	10
2008 - 2011	21
2012 - 2015	4
2016 - 2019	2

Note: The table shows the term limits during which prosecuted mayors of LAPOP municipalities were in office. Each mayor corresponds to a different municipality. There are a total of 45 sample municipalities.

Table 3: Cross-sectional Characteristics of Treated and Non-Treated Municipalities

	Subsamples (Mean)		P-value
	Non-Treated	Treated	
Population	57900	544960.57	0.03
Share of rural population	0.31	0.26	0.51
Pre-period prosecution of mayors	0.88	0.89	0.96
Municipal income	27108.54	514935.93	0.04
Transfers from central government	989.90	4789.94	0.15
Yearly armed conflict attacks	2.33	18.95	0.00

Note: Treated municipalities are those that have a prosecuted mayor during the sample period, otherwise they are non-treated. Municipal income and transfers from the central government are expressed in millions (COP). Population, share of rural population, municipal income and transfers from the central government are taken from year 2010. The pre-period prosecution of mayors indicates the total number of prosecuted mayors per municipality between 2004 and 2010. Yearly armed conflict attacks are averaged between 2000 and 2010 for each municipality. The P-value indicates the significance of the difference of means between treated and non-treated municipalities.

Table 4: Mayor's probability of being prosecuted in sample municipalities

$\mathbb{1}(\text{Mayor was prosecuted})$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Margin of victory > 50th percentile _{mt}	-0.040 (0.070)	-0.029 (0.076)		
Margin of victory > 75th percentile _{mt}			-0.071 (0.081)	-0.072 (0.083)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mayoral Term Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Party Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	179	179	179	179

Notes: The unit of observation is municipality-mayoral term. The sample mayoral terms are: 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015, 2016-2019. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the mayor was prosecuted by the PGN between 2004 and 2019. Margin of victory > 50th percentile_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the mayor's margin of victory in his election was greater than the median within sample municipalities. Margin of victory > 75th percentile_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the mayor's margin of victory was greater than the 75th percentile within sample municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Mayor's probability of being prosecuted in sample municipalities

$\mathbb{1}(\text{Mayor was prosecuted})$		
	(1)	(2)
Liberal Party	0.045 (0.076)	0.067 (0.085)
Social Party of Unity	0.004 (0.129)	0.014 (0.128)
Radical Change Party	-0.120 (0.154)	-0.112 (0.161)
Conservative Party	-0.130 (0.125)	-0.112 (0.132)
Movement Colombia Alive		0.200 (0.155)
Social Indigenous Alliance (ASI)		0.186 (0.173)
Alternative Indigenous and Social Alliance (MAIS)		-0.001 (0.260)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.456	0.456
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mayoral Term Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	179	179

Notes: The unit of observation is municipality-mayoral term. The sample mayoral terms are: 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015, 2016-2019. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the mayor was prosecuted by the PGN between 2004 and 2019. Covariates are dummy variables that equal 1 if the mayor was affiliated to each political party. The remaining political parties are grouped in one residual group, which is excluded from the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Political Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in the mayor's office</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	-0.151 (0.127)	-0.037 (0.132)	-0.024 (0.133)	-0.147 (0.135)	-0.004 (0.145)	-0.014 (0.143)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.022 (0.317)	-0.166 (0.249)	-0.081 (0.178)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.169	-0.169	-0.095
F-test (P-value)				0.571	0.477	0.569
<i>Panel B. Supports the Colombian political system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.278** (0.122)	0.328*** (0.121)	0.447*** (0.108)	0.378*** (0.110)	0.455*** (0.115)	0.496*** (0.106)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.554** (0.245)	-0.631*** (0.208)	-0.382** (0.189)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.176	-0.176	0.115
F-test (P-value)				0.513	0.427	0.588
<i>Panel C. Feels pride living under the Colombian political system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.163 (0.114)	0.213* (0.117)	0.277** (0.117)	0.222* (0.119)	0.294** (0.121)	0.309*** (0.114)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.327*** (0.094)	-0.408*** (0.077)	-0.243** (0.108)
Bulletin _{mt} + Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.105	-0.114	0.065
F-test (P-value)				0.307	0.159	0.638
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7359 and mean 3.67. Panel B, obs 7301 and mean 4.34. Panel C, obs 7383 and mean 4.01. The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7: Effect of the Bulletin’s Publication on Trust in Judicial Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in the justice system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.206** (0.101)	0.265*** (0.097)	0.297*** (0.094)	0.244** (0.107)	0.324*** (0.107)	0.294*** (0.097)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.213 (0.180)	-0.298* (0.159)	0.027 (0.148)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				0.032	0.026	0.321
F-test (P-value)				0.861	0.856	0.043
<i>Panel B. Trusts courts guarantee a fair trial</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.176** (0.079)	0.207*** (0.071)	0.230*** (0.082)	0.194** (0.085)	0.241*** (0.076)	0.221** (0.082)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.103 (0.072)	-0.168** (0.063)	0.070 (0.114)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				0.091	0.072	0.291
F-test (P-value)				0.249	0.252	0.046
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7377 and mean 3.56. Panel B, obs 7236 and mean 3.42. The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel’s name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor’s office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 8: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Other Political Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in political parties</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.027 (0.090)	0.045 (0.095)	0.053 (0.099)	0.085 (0.098)	0.118 (0.098)	0.089 -0.096
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.371*** (0.079)	-0.283*** -0.085
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.238 0.003	-0.253 0.003	-0.194 0.084
<i>Panel B. Trust in the elections</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.008 (0.109)	0.088 (0.104)	0.163 (0.106)	0.084 (0.116)	0.195* (0.110)	0.205* (0.106)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.422** (0.166)	-0.542*** (0.095)	-0.326*** (0.087)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.339 0.055	-0.347 0.001	-0.121 0.293
<i>Panel C. Trust in Congress</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.093 (0.097)	0.179* (0.098)	0.241** (0.101)	0.159 (0.104)	0.277*** (0.094)	0.279*** -0.099
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.363*** (0.068)	-0.484*** (0.078)	-0.288* -0.145
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.204 0.01	-0.206 0.008	-0.01 0.949
<i>Panel D. Trust in the President</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.066 (0.118)	0.091 (0.122)	0.132 (0.107)	0.145 (0.120)	0.191 (0.126)	0.161 -0.109
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.445** (0.181)	-0.505*** (0.166)	-0.232 -0.147
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.299 0.106	-0.313 0.055	-0.07 0.66
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7351 and mean 2.61. Panel B, obs 7372 and mean 3.35. Panel C, obs 7188 and mean 3.38. Panel D, obs 7415 and mean 3.68. The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 9: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Democracy

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the Colombian Democracy						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bulletin _{mt}	0.019 (0.043)	0.036 (0.043)	0.070 (0.047)	0.041 (0.045)	0.063 (0.044)	0.081* (0.048)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.133* (0.078)	-0.154** (0.070)	-0.108 (0.075)
Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.092 0.243	-0.091 0.200	-0.027 0.736
Mean Dep. Var.	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	6,472	6,472	6,472	6,472	6,472	6,472

Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 10: Heterogeneous Effects of the Bulletin’s Publication According to How Often the Respondent Follows the News

	Trust in justice system	Trust in the courts’ fairness	Supports political system	Pride in political system	Trust in mayor’s office	Trust in political parties	Trust in the elections	Trust in Congress	Trust in the President	Satisfaction w/ democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Bulletin _{mt} x Seldom follows the news _i	0.154 (0.109)	0.167* (0.083)	0.202 (0.124)	0.130 (0.116)	-0.207 (0.130)	-0.014 (0.096)	-0.195* (0.115)	0.050 (0.101)	-0.121 (0.131)	0.012 (0.045)
Bulletin _{mt} x Follows the news daily _i	0.226** (0.102)	0.179** (0.080)	0.313** (0.123)	0.178 (0.115)	-0.118 (0.130)	0.050 (0.090)	0.116 (0.111)	0.111 (0.098)	0.179 (0.114)	0.021 (0.045)
F-test (P-value)	0.186	0.786	0.020	0.242	0.217	0.134	0.000	0.115	0.000	0.720
Mean Dep. Var.	3.562	3.425	4.338	4.014	3.669	2.613	3.348	3.38	3.682	2.219
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,345	7,207	7,271	7,352	7,328	7,320	7,340	7,157	7,383	6,455


Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in header. In all columns, respondents in treatment municipalities are divided according to how frequently they report to follow the news. Seldom follows the news_i is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent reports to follow the news once a week, once a month or never. Follows the news daily_i is a dummy that indicates if the respondent follows the news every day. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time *t* the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality *m*. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the difference between coefficients of both groups of respondents. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 11: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Public Institutions

	Trust in justice system	Trust in the courts' fairness	Supports political system	Pride in political system	Trust in mayor's office	Trust in political parties	Trust in the elections	Trust in Congress	Trust in the President	Satisfaction w/ democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A. Heterogeneity according to highest level of education</i>										
Bulletin _{mt} x Basic Education _i	0.267** (0.101)	0.204** (0.079)	0.334*** (0.123)	0.253** (0.113)	-0.101 (0.130)	0.044 (0.090)	0.047 (0.109)	0.166* (0.097)	0.163 (0.118)	0.025 (0.043)
Bulletin _{mt} x Tertiary Education _i	-0.059 (0.113)	0.060 (0.085)	0.086 (0.128)	-0.156 (0.120)	-0.298** (0.135)	-0.044 (0.102)	-0.114 (0.121)	-0.192* (0.110)	-0.309** (0.136)	-0.010 (0.046)
F-test (P-value)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.116	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.062
<i>Panel B. Heterogeneity according to household assets</i>										
Bulletin _{mt} x Low Assets _i	0.306*** (0.101)	0.233*** (0.082)	0.366*** (0.123)	0.288** (0.116)	-0.136 (0.130)	0.029 (0.091)	0.043 (0.112)	0.188* (0.102)	0.183 (0.124)	0.031 (0.047)
Bulletin _{mt} x High Assets _i	0.076 (0.116)	0.102 (0.079)	0.165 (0.134)	0.003 (0.125)	-0.171 (0.136)	0.025 (0.097)	-0.036 (0.117)	-0.032 (0.098)	-0.086 (0.124)	0.004 (0.042)
F-test (P-value)	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.652	0.928	0.208	0.000	0.001	0.243
Mean Dep. Var.	3.562	3.425	4.338	4.014	3.669	2.613	3.348	3.38	3.682	2.219
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,377	7,236	7,301	7,383	7,359	7,351	7,372	7,188	7,415	6,472


Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in header. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . In Panel A respondents in treatment municipalities are divided in two groups according to their level of education. Individuals whose highest level of education is up to secondary level are grouped under the category Basic Education_i. Else, if respondents have tertiary education, they are included in the Tertiary Education_i group. In Panel B, individuals in treatment municipalities are divided according to the number of assets owned by their household. They are classified in the Low assets_i group if they own less than the sample median number of assets, else they are assigned to the High assets_i group. I calculate their total number of assets by adding those owned by the respondent's household from the following list: Television, fridge, landline phone, cellphone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, running water, bathroom, and computer. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In each panel, the F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the difference between coefficients of both groups of respondents. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Percentage of Municipalities with a Prosecuted Mayor per Quarter



Notes: The figure shows the percentage of sample municipalities whose mayor is the subject of a disciplinary prosecution by the Office of the Inspector General (PGN). The figure includes prosecutions up to a year before the first survey is conducted in each municipality. Surveys are conducted between 2012-Q1 and 2018-Q4.


Figure 2: Event Studies of the Effect of the Bulletin’s Publication on Trust in Public Institutions



Notes: The vertical axis plots coefficients from a regression of individual-level outcomes of trust in institutions on yearly dummies during a 3-year window before and after the publication of a PGN bulletin in the respondent’s municipality. The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. The horizontal axis indicates the number of periods before and after the event. The year immediately before the bulletin’s publication is excluded in all regressions. Confidence intervals at the 90% level with clustering at the municipality level are also shown. Regressions also include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as baseline time-varying municipal controls. These include year fixed effects interacted with initial population and initial municipal income.


Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Robustness Check: Average Effect of the Bulletin’s Publication on Trust in Public Institutions




Notes: Figures A1a - A1j show the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals from separate regressions excluding the municipality in the y-axis from the sample. All regressions estimate equation 1, where the main independent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if at the time of the LAPOP survey the PGN had published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of the respondent’s municipality. The dependent variable is shown above each figure. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as baseline time-varying municipal controls. These include year fixed effects interacted with initial population and initial municipal income. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.


(c) Supports the Political System




(d) Pride in the Political System




(e) Trust in Political Parties




(f) Trust in the Elections



(g) Trust in the Mayor's Office



(h) Trust in Congress



(i) Trust in the President




(j) Satisfaction with Democracy



Figure A2: Robustness Check: Interaction Effect of the Bulletin’s Publication on Trust in Public Institutions


(a) Supports the Justice System

(b) Trusts the Courts Guarantee a Free Trial




Notes: Figures Figures A2a - A2j show the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals from separate regressions excluding the municipality in the y-axis from the sample. All regressions estimate equation 2, in which the regressors of interest are Bulletin and Bulletin x Same Party. These are defined as follows: i) Bulletin is a dummy that equals 1 if at the time of the LAPOP survey the PGN had published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of the respondent’s municipality. ii) Same Party is a dummy that equals 1 if the political party affiliated with the prosecuted mayor is the incumbent at the time of the LAPOP survey, under the government of a mayor different from the prosecuted one. Bulletin x Same Party is the interaction term between these two variables. The dependent variable is shown above each figure. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as baseline time-varying municipal controls. These include year fixed effects interacted with initial population and initial municipal income. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.


(c) Supports the Political System




(d) Pride in the Political System




(e) Trust in Political Parties




(f) Trust in the Elections




(g) Trust in the Mayor's Office



(h) Trust in Congress



(i) Trust in the President



(j) Satisfaction with Democracy




Table A1: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Political Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in the mayor's office</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	-0.215*	-0.112	-0.108	-0.221*	-0.088	-0.103
	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.137)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				0.031	-0.112	-0.033
				(0.327)	(0.256)	(0.176)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.19	-0.2	-0.136
F-test (P-value)				0.54	0.415	0.414
<i>Panel B. Supports the political system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.233*	0.276**	0.392***	0.330***	0.398***	0.440***
	-0.122	-0.124	-0.107	-0.107	-0.115	-0.106
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.514**	-0.589***	-0.368*
				-0.245	-0.209	-0.203
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.184	-0.19	0.071
F-test (P-value)				0.503	0.4	0.749
<i>Panel C. Feels pride living under the Colombian political system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.112	0.157	0.213*	0.167	0.233*	0.242*
	-0.118	-0.121	-0.123	-0.125	-0.127	-0.122
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.289**	-0.371***	-0.222**
				-0.113	-0.087	-0.109
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.122	-0.138	0.02
F-test (P-value)				0.314	0.136	0.888
Individual-Level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7235 and mean 3.669. Panel B, obs 7187 and mean 4.338. Panel C, obs 7262 and mean 4.014. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Individual-level controls include sex, age quartiles, assets quartiles and maximum level of education. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A2: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Judicial Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in the justice system</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.156 (0.101)	0.214** (0.097)	0.243** (0.095)	0.186* (0.106)	0.264** (0.106)	0.234** (0.098)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.158 (0.179)	-0.244 (0.149)	0.070 (0.151)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				0.029	0.02	0.304
F-test (P-value)				0.876	0.886	0.057
<i>Panel B. Trusts courts guarantee a fair trial</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.144* (0.076)	0.175** (0.067)	0.194** (0.081)	0.155* (0.081)	0.200*** (0.073)	0.181** (0.082)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.056 (0.077)	-0.122** (0.057)	0.098 (0.114)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				0.099	0.078	0.279
F-test (P-value)				0.239	0.187	0.049
Individual-Level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7251 and mean 3.562. Panel B, obs 7111 and mean 3.425. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Individual-level controls include sex, age quartiles, assets quartiles and maximum level of education. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Other Political Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. Trust in political parties</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	-0.008 (0.088)	0.004 (0.095)	0.007 (0.095)	0.050 (0.095)	0.077 (0.098)	0.041 (-0.093)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.307*** (0.077)	-0.354*** (0.078)	-0.261*** (-0.092)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.257 0.001	-0.277 0.001	-0.22 0.042
<i>Panel B. Trust in the elections</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	-0.051 (0.104)	0.021 (0.097)	0.087 (0.095)	0.022 (0.109)	0.125 (0.102)	0.125 (0.096)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.386** (0.185)	-0.509*** (0.107)	-0.292*** (0.101)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.364 0.067	-0.384 0.001	-0.167 0.166
<i>Panel C. Trust in Congress</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.041 (0.096)	0.119 (0.095)	0.174* (0.101)	0.098 (0.103)	0.205** (0.094)	0.207** (0.100)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.296*** (0.075)	-0.413*** (0.079)	-0.248** (0.142)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.198 0.021	-0.207 0.009	-0.041 0.781
<i>Panel D. Trust in the President</i>						
Bulletin _{mt}	0.006 (0.123)	0.028 (0.129)	0.065 (0.116)	0.079 (0.127)	0.121 (0.136)	0.088 (0.120)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.389** (0.181)	-0.451*** (0.159)	-0.174 (0.153)
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party F-test (P-value)				-0.31 0.101	-0.331 0.038	-0.086 0.606
Individual-Level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The number of observations and dependent variable means are as follows: Panel A, obs 7228 and mean 2.61. Panel B, obs 7244 and mean 3.35. Panel C, obs 7067 and mean 3.38. Panel D, obs 7289 and mean 3.68. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Individual-level controls include sex, age quartiles, assets quartiles and maximum level of education. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Effect of the Bulletin's Publication on Trust in Democracy

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the Colombian Democracy						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bulletin _{mt}	0.034	0.046	0.087**	0.061	0.078*	0.099**
	-0.038	-0.039	-0.043	-0.039	-0.039	-0.044
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}				-0.156**	-0.174**	-0.121*
				-0.072	-0.066	-0.069
Sum Bulletin + Bulletin x Same Party				-0.095	-0.096	-0.021
F-test (P-value)				0.187	0.15	0.77
Mean Dep. Var.	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219	2.219
Individual-Level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects x Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruling Party Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	6,394	6,394	6,394	6,394	6,394	6,394

Notes: All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in the panel's name. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Individual-level controls include sex, age quartiles, assets quartiles and maximum level of education. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Additional controls include average armed conflict attacks between 2000-2010, and number of prosecuted mayors between 2004-2010. Ruling party fixed effects control for the incumbent political party in the mayor's office at time t . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the sum of coefficients. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A5: Heterogeneous Effects of the Bulletin's Publication According to the Popularity of the Incumbent Mayor

	Trust in justice system	Trust in the courts' fairness	Supports political system	Pride in political system	Trust in mayor's office	Trust in political parties	Trust in the elections	Trust in Congress	Trust in the President	Satisfaction w/ democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Bulletin _{mt} x Low margin of victory _m	0.128 (0.110)	0.154* (0.077)	0.249* (0.130)	0.105 (0.127)	-0.234 (0.150)	-0.014 (0.094)	-0.065 (0.120)	0.043 (0.107)	0.003 (0.139)	0.034 (0.039)
Bulletin _{mt} x High margin of victory _m	0.326** (0.123)	0.209* (0.113)	0.323** (0.141)	0.255* (0.132)	-0.021 (0.177)	0.093 (0.130)	0.122 (0.142)	0.168 (0.109)	0.164 (0.140)	-0.007 (0.072)
F-test (P-val)	0.093	0.585	0.552	0.245	0.324	0.414	0.227	0.215	0.314	0.51
Mean Dep. Var.	3.562	3.425	4.338	4.014	3.669	2.613	3.348	3.38	3.682	2.219
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,377	7,236	7,301	7,383	7,359	7,351	7,372	7,188	7,415	6,472

Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in header. In all columns, respondents in treatment municipalities are divided according to the margin of victory of the incumbent mayor. They are classified in the High margin of victory_m group if their mayor's margin of victory is above the 75th percentile, else they are assigned to the Low margin of victory_m group. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time *t* the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality *m*. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the difference between coefficients of both groups of respondents. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A6: Heterogeneous Effects of the Bulletin’s Publication According to the Popularity of the Prosecuted Mayor

	Trust in justice system	Trust in the courts’ fairness	Supports political system	Pride in political system	Trust in mayor’s office	Trust in political parties	Trust in the elections	Trust in Congress	Trust in the President	Satisfaction w/ democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Bulletin _{mt} x Low margin of victory _m	0.277** (0.127)	0.258*** (0.090)	0.346** (0.160)	0.250* (0.146)	-0.090 (0.152)	0.045 (0.102)	-0.016 (0.134)	0.143 (0.107)	0.162 (0.142)	0.012 (0.052)
Bulletin _{mt} x High margin of victory _m	0.014 (0.155)	-0.049 (0.143)	0.095 (0.141)	-0.069 (0.174)	-0.317 (0.307)	-0.021 (0.191)	0.076 (0.151)	-0.046 (0.218)	-0.195 (0.191)	0.045 (0.063)
F-test (P-val)	0.182	0.063	0.231	0.171	0.532	0.761	0.648	0.436	0.124	0.686
Mean Dep. Var.	3.562	3.425	4.338	4.014	3.669	2.613	3.348	3.38	3.682	2.219
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,377	7,236	7,301	7,383	7,359	7,351	7,372	7,188	7,415	6,472

Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Dependent variable is shown in header. In all columns, respondents in treatment municipalities are divided according to the margin of victory of the prosecuted mayor. They are classified in the High margin of victory_m group if their mayor’s margin of victory is above the 75th percentile, else they are assigned to the Low margin of victory_m group. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time *t* the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality *m*. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The F-test (P-value) indicates the significance of the difference between coefficients of both groups of respondents. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A7: Effect of the Bulletin’s Publication on News’ Viewership

Dependent variable: $\mathbb{1}(\text{Follows the news daily})$		
	(1)	(2)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.017 (0.033)
Bulletin _{mt} x Same Party _{mt}		-0.005 (0.029)
Mean Dep.Var.	0.673	0.673
Year Fixed Effects x Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,456	7,456

Notes: The unit of observation is individual-municipality-year. Both regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent reports following the news every day, as opposed to once a week, once a month or never. Bulletin_{mt} is a dummy indicating if at time t the PGN has published a bulletin about a disciplinary prosecution against the mayor of municipality m . Same Party_{mt} is a dummy indicating if the prosecuted mayor was endorsed by a political party that is the incumbent in municipality m at time t , under the government of a different mayor. Baseline controls include population and municipal income, measured in 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A8: Media Coverage of PGN Prosecutions

Municipality	Mayor	Bulletin's Date	News Coverage
Ciénaga de Oro	Plinio Humberto D'Paola Cuello	5/10/2011	El Heraldo. (2011, May 10). Procuraduría adelanta audiencia pública contra alcalde de Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba. https://www.elheraldo.co/region/procuraduria-adelanta-audiencia-publica-contra-alcalde-de-cienaga-de-oro-cordoba-20593
Bogotá	Samuel Moreno	5/3/2011	El Espectador. (2011, May 3). Samuel Moreno, suspendido por tres meses del cargo. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/samuel-moreno-suspendido-por-tres-meses-del-cargo/ El Tiempo. (2011, May 3). Procuraduría suspendió por tres meses al alcalde Samuel Moreno. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-9266960 Semana. (2011, May 3). Suspensión de Samuel Moreno: la debacle del Polo Democrático. https://www.semana.com/suspension-samuel-moreno-debacle-del-polo-democratico/239272-3/ Dinero. (2011, May 3). Samuel Moreno no renuncia y apelará suspensión. https://www.dinero.com/pais/articulo/samuel-moreno-no-renuncia-apelara-suspension/118517 Portafolio. (2011, May 3). Procuraduría suspende a alcalde de Bogotá. https://www.portafolio.co/economia/finanzas/procuraduria-suspende-alcalde-bogota-130398 El Heraldo. (2011, May 3). Procuraduría suspendió por tres meses a Samuel Moreno. https://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/procuraduria-suspension-por-tres-meses-samuel-moreno-19685 El Tiempo. (2011, May 4). La suspensión de Samuel Moreno desata tormenta en Bogotá. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4534921 El Tiempo. (2011, May 26). Procuraduría ratificó suspensión por tres meses a Samuel Moreno. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-9458165 Semana. (2011, May 26). Procuraduría confirma suspensión por tres meses a Samuel Moreno. https://www.semana.com/procuraduria-confirma-suspension-tres-meses-samuel-moreno/240383-3/
Bucaramanga	Fernando Vargas Mendoza	6/14/2011	Vanguardia. (2011, June 14). Alcalde y dos funcionarios deberán responder por millonaria contratación. https://www.vanguardia.com/politica/108649-alcalde-y-dos-funcionarios-deberan-responder-por-millonaria-contratacion-DCVL108649 Vanguardia. (2011, June 20). Imputan cargos al Alcalde de Bucaramanga por irregularidades en contratos. https://www.vanguardia.com/politica/109456-imputan-cargos-al-alcalde-de-bucaramanga-por-irregularidades-en-contratos-OCVL109456
Neiva	Cielo González Villa	6/30/2011	El Tiempo. (2011, June 30). Procuraduría suspendió por dos meses a ex alcaldesa de Neiva. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-9761525 La Nación. (2011, August 14). Suspendida en primera instancia Gobernadora del Huila. https://www.lanacion.com.co/suspendida-en-primera-instancia-gobernadora-del-huila/
Santa Marta	José Francisco Zúñiga Riascos	9/5/2011	El Heraldo. (2011, September 5). Pliegos de cargos contra exalcalde de Santa Marta y exfuncionarios de la administración distrital. https://www.elheraldo.co/regi-n/pliegos-de-cargos-contra-exalcalde-de-santa-marta-y-exfuncionarios-de-la-administraci-n-distr
Cúcuta	Ramiro Suárez Corzo	10/5/2011	Caracol. (2011, October 5). Sancionado exalcalde de Cúcuta Ramiro Suárez y 17 concejales. Caracol Noticias, Octubre 5 de 2011. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2011/10/05/judicial/1317802200_557825.html La Opinión. (2011, October 5). Suspendidos Ramiro Suárez y los 16 concejales investigados por el Parque Bavaria. https://www.laopinion.com.co/suspendidos-ramiro-su-rez-y-los-16-concejales-investigados-por-el-parque-bavaria-17334
Ibagué	Jesús María Botero Gutiérrez	10/24/2011	El Nuevo Siglo. (2011, October 25). Pliego de cargos contra alcalde de Ibagué. https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/10-2011-pliego-de-cargos-contra-alcalde-de-ibague
Montería	León Fidel Ojeda y Marcos Daniel Pineda García	10/21/2011	El Heraldo. (2011, October 21). Pliego de cargos contra alcalde y exalcalde de Montería. https://www.elheraldo.co/noticias/pliego-de-cargos-contra-alcalde-y-exalcalde-de-monter%C3%ADa-42673

Municipality	Mayor	Bulletin's Date	News Coverage
Medellín	Alonso Salazar Jaramillo	10/25/2011	El Espectador. (2011, October 25). Procuraduría abrió investigación disciplinaria contra alcalde de Medellín. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/procuraduria-abrio-investigacion-disciplinaria-contralcalde-de-medellin/ El Heraldó. (2011, October 25). Procuraduría investigará al alcalde de Medellín por presunta intervención en política. https://www.elheraldo.co/pol%C3%ADtica/procuradur%C3%ADa-investigar%C3%A1-al-alcalde-de-medell%C3%ADn-por-presunta-intervenci%C3%B3n-en-pol%C3%ADtica-43202
Cali	Jorge Iván Ospina Gómez	2/18/2011	W Radio. (2011, February 18). Procuraduría formula pliego de cargos contra alcalde de Cali. https://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/judicial/procuraduria-formula-pliego-de-cargos-contralcalde-de-cali/20110218/nota/1428138.aspx Caracol Radio. (2011, February 18). Procuraduría elevó cargos al alcalde de Cali, Jorge Iván Ospina. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2011/02/18/judicial/1298064060_428216.amp.html El Tiempo. (2011, October 20). Elean pliego de cargos contra el Alcalde de Cali. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4406195
Manizales	Luis Roberto Rivas Montoya	12/15/2011	El Nuevo Siglo. (2011, December 15). Destituyen e inhabilitan a exalcalde de Manizales. https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/12-2011-destituyen-e-inhabilitan-a-exalcalde-de-manizales
Chiquinquirá	José Alberto Moreno Villamil	12/23/2011	El Nuevo Siglo. (2011, December 23). Pliego de cargos contra exalcalde de Chiquinquirá. https://elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/12-2011-pliego-de-cargos-contralcalde-de-chiquinquiral El País. (2011, December 23). Pliego de cargos contra ex alcalde de Chiquinquirá. https://www.elpais.com.co/judicial/pliego-de-cargos-contralcalde-de-chiquinquiral.html
Cartagena	Judith del Carmen Pinedo Flórez	1/23/2012	Caracol Radio. (2012, January 23). Pliego de cargos contra Judith Pinedo, exalcaldesa de Cartagena. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2012/01/23/judicial/1327307880_610487.html W Radio (2012, January 23). Pliego de cargos contra la exalcaldesa de Cartagena, Judith Pinedo. https://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/judicial/pliego-de-cargos-contralcaldesa-de-cartagena-judith-pinedo/20120123/nota/1610477.aspx El Tiempo. (2012, January 23). Pliego de cargos contra Judith Pinedo, ex alcaldesa de Cartagena. https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-10985642 El Espectador. (2012, January 23). Abren investigación disciplinaria contra exalcaldesa de Cartagena. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/abren-investigacion-disciplinaria-contralcaldesa-de-cartagena/ Vanguardia. (2012, January 23). Pliego de cargos contra exalcaldesa de Cartagena Judith Pinedo. https://www.vanguardia.com/politica/pliego-de-cargos-contralcaldesa-de-cartagena-judith-pinedo-BGVL140463 Colombia.com. (2012, January 23). Procuraduría formula pliego de cargos contra exalcaldesa de Cartagena. https://www.colombia.com/actualidad/politica/sdi/29835/procuraduria-formula-pliego-de-cargos-contralcaldesa-de-cartagena
Villavicencio	Héctor Manuel Caamaño Chacón	2/6/2012	El Nuevo Siglo. (2012, February 6). Proceso contra exalcalde de Villavicencio. https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/2-2012-proceso-contralcalde-de-villavicencio
Buenaventura	José Felix Ocoro Minotta	5/23/2012	El País. (2012, May 23). Procuraduría sanciona a exalcalde de Buenaventura, José Felix Ocoro. https://www.elpais.com.co/valle/procuraduria-sanciona-a-exalcalde-de-buenaventura-jose-felix-ocoro.html
Filadelfia	Román Aristizábal Vasco	7/31/2012	La Patria. (2012, August 1). El alcalde de Filadelfia (Caldas) habría participado en política. https://www.lapatria.com/caldas/el-alcalde-de-filadelfia-caldas-habria-participado-en-politica-11540
Sincelejo	Jesús Antonio Paternina Samur y Jaime de Jesús Merlano Fernández	8/17/2012	El Universal. (2012, August 18). Procuraduría formula cargos contra dos exalcaldes de Sincelejo. https://www.eluniversal.com.co/regional/procuraduria-formula-cargos-contralcaldes-de-sincelejo-87890-IWEU172082 El Nuevo Siglo. (2012, August 17). Cargos a dos ex alcaldes de Sincelejo. https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/8-2012-cargos-a-dos-ex-alcaldes-de-sincelejo

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Marinilla	Francisco Javier Ramírez Gómez	10/3/2012	Caracol Radio. (2012, October 4). Procuraduría formula cargos contra exalcalde de Marinilla, Antioquia. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2012/10/04/judicial/1349338200.772981.html Noticias Oriente Antioqueño. (2012, October 4). Por nombramiento de gerente del hospital, Procuraduría formula cargos contra exalcalde de Marinilla. https://noticiasorientiantioqueno.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/por-nombramiento-de-gerente-del-hospital-procuraduria-formula-cargos-contra-exalcalde-de-marinilla/ Minuto 30. (2012, October 4). Marinilla: Procuraduría formuló pliego de cargos contra exalcalde. https://www.minuto30.com/nacional/marinilla-procuraduria-formulo-pliego-de-cargos-contra-exalcalde/116033/
San Pedro de Urabá	Hugo Caballero Ballesteros	5/17/2013	El Mundo. (2013, March 17). Exalcalde de San Pedro de Urabá fue llamado a audiencia pública. https://www.elmundo.com/portal/noticias/antioquia/exalcalde_de_san_pedro_de_uraba_fue_llamado_a_audiencia_publica.php#.X9AQm9hKg2w
Dosquebradas	Luz Ensueño Betancur Botero	8/9/2013	Caracol Radio. (2013, August 9). Por 10 años fue inhabilitada la exalcaldesa de Dosquebradas, Luz Ensueño Betancourt. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2013/08/09/judicial/1376053800.948202.html Ciudad Región. (2013, August 2011). En fallo de primera instancia, procuraduría general de la nación destituyó a ex Alcaldesa de Dosquebradas Risaralda. https://www.ciudadregion.com/regiones/risaralda/fallo-primerainstancia-procuraduria-general-nacion-destituyo-ex-alcaldesa-dosquebradas-risaralda.1376227879
Magangué	Arcesio Pérez Bello	1/28/2014	El Heraldo. (2014, January 2014). Procuraduría formula pliego de cargos a exalcalde de Magangué. https://www.elheraldo.co/bolivar/procuraduria-formula-pliego-de-cargos-exalcalde-de-magangue-140758 Caracol Radio. (2014, January 29). Alcaldía y Concejo de Magangué firmaron ilegalmente contrato de aseo. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2014/01/29/regional/1390999560.065746.html El Universal. (2014, January 31). Procuraduría General formula pliego de cargos a exalcalde de Magangué. https://www.eluniversal.com.co/regional/bolivar/procuraduria-general-formula-pliego-de-cargos-exalcalde-de-magangue-150216-MWEU241085
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Puracé	Miguel Yace	4/8/2015	El País. (2015, April 8). Fiscalía formula cargos a Miguel Yace, exalcalde de Puracé, Cauca. https://www.elpais.com.co/judicial/fiscalia-formula-cargos-a-miguel-yace-exalcalde-de-purace-cauca.html Radio Súper Popayán. (2015, March 20). Exalcalde de Puracé-Coconuco (Cauca) aceptó cargos por peculado. http://www.radiosuperpopayan.com/2015/05/20/exalcalde-de-purace-coconuco-cauca-acepto-cargos-por-peculado/
Cumbal	Jorge Humberto Alpala Alpala	11/14/2014	Radio Santa Fé. (2014, November 11). Citan audiencia pública a alcalde de Cumbal por incumplimiento en Ley de Cuotas. http://www.radiosantafe.com/2014/11/14/por-incumplimiento-en-ley-de-cuotas-citan-audiencia-publica-para-alcalde-de-cumbal/

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Girardot	Rodolfo Serrano Monroy	2/27/2015	Noticias Día a Día. (2015, March 1). Procuraduría destituye al ex alcalde de Girardot Rodolfo Serrano. https://www.noticiasdiaadia.com/procuraduria-destituye-al-ex-alcalde-de-girardot-rodolfo-serrano/amp/ RCN Radio. (2015, March 2). Procuraduría sanciona a ex alcalde de Girardot. https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/procuraduria-sanciona-ex-alcalde-de-girardot-196285 Extra Girardot. (2015, March 2). Procuraduría destituyó al alcalde de Girardot Rodolfo Serrano Monroy. https://girardot.extra.com.co/noticias/politica/procuradur%C3%ADa-destituy%C3%B3-al-alcalde-de-girardot-rodolfo-serrano-monroy-127940
Viotá	Eduardo Moreno Peña y Óscar Hernán Quiroga García	3/12/2012	Noticias Día a Día. (2015, March 12). Procuraduría confirma sanción contra ex Alcalde de Viotá, Cundinamarca. https://www.noticiasdiaadia.com/procuraduria-confirma-sancion-contra-ex-alcalde-de-viota-cundinamarca/
La Unión	Hugo Botero López	7/21/2016	La Unión. (2016, June 22). La Procuraduría General de la Nación divulgó que formuló cargos contra el exalcalde municipal de La Unión (Antioquia). https://www.elmundo.com/portal/pagina.general.impresion.php?idx=277003
San Vicente de Chucurí	Luis Ernesto Esteban Macías	6/9/2017	San Vicente Estéreo. (2017, June 23). Procuraduría profirió pliego de cargos a exalcalde de San Vicente de Chucurí. https://www.sanvicentedechucuri.com/procuraduria-profirio-pliego-cargos-exalcalde-san-vicente-chucuri/ Extra. (2017, June 21). Procuraduría de Barrancabermeja emitió fallos a políticos santandereanos. https://extra.com.co/noticias/politica/procuraduria-de-barrancabermeja-emitio-fallos-politicos-sa-318405
Moniquirá	Ancisar Parra Ávila	6/14/2018	Radio Positiva. (2018, June 15). Procuraduría suspendió provisionalmente por 3 meses al alcalde de Moniquirá, Boyacá. https://positiva.fm/news/procuraduria-suspendio-provisionalmente-por-3-meses-al-alcalde-de-moniquira-boyaca#! Extra. (2018, June 14). Suspenden por 3 meses al alcalde de Moniquirá, Boyacá, por hacerle campaña a Duque. https://boyaca.extra.com.co/noticias/judicial/suspenden-por-3-meses-al-alcalde-de-moniquira-boyaca-por-hac-429027
Facatativá	Pablo Emilio Malo García	10/29/2018	La FM. (2018, October 19). Procuraduría investiga al alcalde de Facatativá por viaje a Dubái. https://www.lafm.com.co/judicial/procuraduria-investiga-al-alcalde-de-faca-por-viaje-dubai El Tiempo. (2018, October 19). Por viaje a Dubai, Procuraduría investiga a alcalde de Facatativá. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/procuraduria-abrio-indagacion-preliminar-a-alcalde-de-facatativa-por-viaje-a-dubai-287220 El Espectador. (2018, October 19). Por viaje a Dubai, investigan a alcalde y 12 concejales de Facatativá, Cundinamarca. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/por-viaje-a-dubai-investigacion-a-alcalde-y-12-concejales-de-facatativa-cundinamarca/ W Radio. (2018, October 19). Procuraduría abrió indagación preliminar contra el alcalde de Facatativá. https://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/judicial/procuraduria-abrio-indagacion-preliminar-contra-el-alcalde-de-facatativa/20181029/nota/3818072.aspx Cable Noticias. (2018, October 19). Abren investigación contra el alcalde de Facatativá por viaje a Dubai. https://www.cablenoticias.tv/nacionales/abren-investigacion-contra-el-alcalde-de-facatativa-por-viaje-a-dubai/ Periodismo Público. (2018, November 5). Procuraduría abre investigación a alcalde de Facatativá. https://periodismopublico.com/procuraduria-abre-investigacion-a-alcalde-de-facatativa