

**Is Oil a Kickstarter for Independence?
Lessons from South Sudan, East Timor, and Chechnya**

Author: Mariana Jaramillo Caro

Director: Dr. Víctor M. Mijares

Reader: Dr. Jean-Marie Chenou

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Department of Political Science – Faculty of Social Sciences

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

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ABSTRACT

Due to the volatile behavior of hydrocarbons in the economic scenario, the way that oil dynamics unfold in the international arena can change, in any given moment, which actors hold power and how they use it to further their agenda. Also, if a new actor with hydrocarbon availability is introduced in the international arena, the entire system shifts and adapts to the existence of a potential power figure. The peoples of South Sudan, East Timor, and Chechnya had all sought independence since the 20th century, which resulted in the secession of South Sudan and East Timor and the Chechen failed attempt. These cases all have different forms in which the hydrocarbons are present, whether in the subsoil, through pipelines, or in the seabed, which allowed a deeper understanding of the issue. This dissertation evaluates the factors involved in the independence processes of possible petrostates to understand just how relevant the control of hydrocarbons is to the success of a secessionist movement. It was found that, to an extent, having control of the resources allows the possibility for an effective secession if the separatist group has international backing for their claim.

I. INTRODUCTION

International security is fragile. Its stability depends on several factors that range from military, economic, and political to cultural. Nevertheless, one key change is the insertion of a new actor into the international arena. This could mean either a radical change in the government of an existing state or the emergence of an entirely new one. Having control of resources is one of the ways in which a state positions itself as powerful in the international system. During the last decades, the world has seen how territories with an abundance of energetic resources have initiated secessionist attempts, threatening the current international order. Independence processes and their success conditions (economic, political, social, or military) have been widely studied, given their relevance to understanding how the emergence of a new state changes established international dynamics.

Nevertheless, research about how secessionist movements in petrostates come to be is scarce. Developing this specific research is relevant due to the fundamental role hydrocarbons play in the current international arena. It doesn't only influence commerce and the economy, but it also alters politics.

This dissertation will focus on new states, specifically those with hydrocarbons, given that the emergence of a new actor with resources as powerful as those would mean a shift in the international system. The case studies used for this research were South Sudan, East Timor, and Chechnya, as they had symmetries that allowed comparison. South Sudan and East Timor are both countries that achieved independence in the 21st century. At the same time, Chechnya is a Russian republic located in its southwest regions, which has actively attempted secession since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nevertheless, as they were not identical, it was possible to identify the factors that played a part in Chechnya's failure to achieve independence and the

significance of hydrocarbons' control. South Sudan and East Timor achieved secession through democratic processes, respectively, in 2011 and 2002. These countries are also characterized by having hydrocarbons as their main source of income, with these resources representing 94.6% and 73,9% of their total exports (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2019). These two nations have had a complex relationship with oil as the countries from which they became independent, Sudan and Indonesia, benefited from their oil reserves. In addition to this, South Sudan and East Timor have had ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts due to European colonization in Africa and Southeast Asia, with the previously mentioned countries. This leads to thinking that the separatist movement arises from the search for economic and political autonomy and ethnic and religious self-determination.

Like the South Sudanese and Timorese cases, Chechnya has different cultural characteristics from those present in most of Russia due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In addition to this, Chechnya is located in a Russian region that contains oil in its subsoil. However, its relevance lies in the strategic position for the hydrocarbon trade, being a transportation point for Russian oil and gas and the refineries that were key to the development of the Russian oil industry. Thus, it could be argued that it has conditions similar to those of South Sudan and East Timor, having different cultural conditions and hydrocarbons. However, despite their efforts for independence since the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and progress in terms of economic autonomy, Chechnya has not been able to complete the secession process.

This research will tackle this lack of knowledge by analyzing the problem under four aspects that are considered key to successful secessions. There's a mixture of several factors that play a part in whether a region secedes or not. Given that this dissertation focuses on secessionist movements in petrostates, it's imperative to discuss the relevance of hydrocarbons. Today,

hydrocarbons are the most used energetic source, constituting 85% of energetic usage. Having control of this type of natural resource implies a powerful position in the international system. It places a country in the position to control both offer and demand. It is also relevant to think about the leadership necessary for an independence movement to succeed or fail. In a state where its leader isn't successful, it's more likely that they don't control their people or territory. Therefore, it's easier for a movement to advance. On the contrary, if the state leader is a strong one, it's far less likely for someone to move to rebel against them.

Another one of those aspects refers to how strong a state is when facing the challenge of one of its territories seeking independence. If a state is weakened, it would be far more plausible for a group to organize themselves and seek independence. On the other hand, if a state is strong, it's far less likely for an uprising to occur, given that there would be existing forces to counter the insurgence. Similarly, having international support grants a very big leap in the process of achieving independence. Suppose sovereign states recognize the territory that seeks secession as independent. In that case, more will likely fall in line, creating pressure from the state from which the territory wants to secede to give in to their demands.

It's important to note that this dissertation will not produce applicative results, but it will present an explicative answer. Nevertheless, this research will try to understand secession in petrostates focusing on the Chechen independence attempt. To this dissertation, literature about the case studies was used, specifically historical documents and reports that account for the events that took place in South Sudan after Sudan's independence from Great Britain; in East Timor during Suharto's regime and control of Timor, and the development of the secessionist attempts since the dissolution of the Soviet Union until the end of the Second Chechen War.

This research does not propose a causal response to secession in petrostates. Instead, it evaluates the degree to which hydrocarbons interfere in the success of an independence movement in a territory with this resource. This thesis has a problem of representation for developing theories, given that it's not a widely studied topic and its possible case studies are very limited. Nevertheless, this research will focus on the 21st century, which is why it may be useful to theorize future secessionist movements in territories with hydrocarbons. This research also faced the problem of information availability, as certain documents were written in the native language of the studied territory, in this case, Russian, Portuguese, or Arab; or there's limited access by the government, which is why unintentionally there may be an omission of data that could have been useful.

A question that allowed the understanding of independence movements in petrostates of the 21st century is presented: ¿what role do hydrocarbons play in secessionist processes of States with the presence of hydrocarbons? Answering this question offers the opportunity to understand power dynamics in the international system and how they vary depending on who has control over the availability of oil. This research aimed to explore secessionist processes in hydrocarbon-rich states, taking the cases of the successful independence of East Timor and South Sudan and Chechnya's attempts.

This dissertation first explained the problem and briefly introduced the aspects that play a part in the secessionist movements in petrostates. The methodology and thorough explanation of the variables were presented to create a comprehensive background for the next chapter. Afterwards, the historical evidence was explained, focusing on the relevant characteristics to analyze the research problem in each separate case. Next, the relevance of hydrocarbons in secessionist processes was discussed, and finally, conclusions were presented to answer the research question.

II. METHODOLOGY

i. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Secession

This research's dependent variable is secession, which can be understood as either secession or no secession. Secession is understood using the concepts of Heraclides (1992), Buchanan (1992), Moore (2002), and Ohlin, Patten, and Mégret (2016). These authors propose a theoretical approach that allows the definition of conditions in which a secessionist process can happen. Heraclides (1992) states that "a separatist movement can be defined as an active political movement within an independent State, which aspires to achieve some sort of territorial separatism, from autonomy to independence." (p.400). Buchanan introduces the right to secede, saying that it refers to the re-appropriation by its legitimate owners of stolen property.

Similarly, Buchanan proposes discriminative redistribution as justification for secession, in the way that a state implements policies and economic programs that harm certain groups while others benefit from them. This can be analyzed with oil exploitation in territories that seek secession and the economic support that this gives the independent state. Moore (2002) identifies the remedial right to secede for groups that "have suffered certain types of injustices, and for which there are bases to believe that these injustices cannot be eliminated until the group is no longer in the state." (p.277). Patten (2016) proposes three types of self-determination: state-wise, democratic and nationalist. The first one refers to the one that seeks state autonomy and sovereignty to be internationally recognized. The democratic self-determination argues that citizens have interests

to determine their society's development, which is why they reject third-party interventions to look out for their community's wellbeing. The national perspective focuses on the population's self-determination in sociocultural terms within the global multiculturalism.

This research understands secession as a unilateral process that seeks independence from an annexationist state, based on motivations that could be either for just cause or choice and based on a self-determination desire to achieve state-wise and cultural autonomy. This variable was observed by analyzing the successful secession processes of South Sudan and East Timor. Given that this is a dichotomic variable, it was measured by de facto independence. With this, the conditions under which East Timor and South Sudan achieved independence were understood and contrasted with Chechnya's current characteristics and how they differ.

Control of hydrocarbons

It is a dichotomic variable that was presented as control or lack of control of hydrocarbons. Reyna and Behrends (2008) define petroleum as a key, scarce and strategic resource necessary to almost all capitalist initiatives. They also address theoretical approaches to petroleum as a blessing or a curse, mentioning issues such as the Dutch disease and the fatalist greed of States that don't seek diversification. Additionally, they introduce a political science approach as a development difficulty for petrostates that seek income. It implies that the public and the private sector must be joined, as petroleum producers are the ones that fulfill the state's economic needs. South Sudan and East Timor are both countries with hydrocarbons as their most important export product, making them dependent. Chechnya is a region in southwest Russia with petroleum under its grounds; nevertheless, its strategic position for commerce made it of geographic relevance. Shlapentokh (2019) shows a report of the distribution of oil and gas in Russia and the key location

that Chechnya has. The author also exposes how hydrocarbon dynamics have developed in the past years and the conflicts that the Russian government has had with oil and gas regions, including the gas supply cut to certain regions of the North Caucasus.

This research understands the control of hydrocarbons in a territorial capacity. This means that this dissertation will consider how governments or separatist movements control the operations and overview the grounds on which oil is extracted. In addition to this, this dissertation also considered the sovereign control of hydrocarbons when analyzing to have a more defining aspect that would allow a complete definition of control of resources. Research papers and reports were used to gather information on how the control over a specific location shifted through the time studied. This data allowed the evaluation of the possibility of secession, given access to a key natural resource that allows the survival of a new nation.

State capacity

This is a dichotomic variable presented as a capable state or not. Soifer (2015) argues that authority based on status originates from agreed-upon prestige by important members of society. The one that's based on position corresponds to its legitimacy as a state officer. With this, a situation arises in which a bureaucrat without authority based on status must construct an authority based on position, which increases coercive power. Mann (2007) defines the state with four elements: the differentiated ensemble of institutions and personnel, centralization of political relations, territorially delimited area, and a monopoly of physical violence. In addition to this, Mann discerns despotic power from infrastructural power. This first one refers to the actions that the political elite can take without negotiations¹. The second distinction refers to the state's capacity to execute

¹ Power of the state elite over the civil society.

political decisions over the entire territory²³. Dinecco (2018) proposes conditions under which the state's functionality can be effective. These are fiscal centralization⁴, institutional impartiality,⁵ and state efficiency.⁶ Giraudy (2012) introduces three dimensions that are considered essential for a state to be strong and stable. These dimensions correspond to territorial reach⁷, the autonomy of non-state actors⁸, and bureaucratic capacity⁹. With this, Giraudy proposes the following categorization:

Territorial reach + bureaucratic capacity + autonomy of non-state actors = *strong state*

No territorial reach + **no** bureaucratic capacity + **no** autonomy of non-state actors = *weak state*

No territorial reach + **no** bureaucratic capacity + autonomy of non-state actors = *non-reaching state*

No territorial reach + bureaucratic capacity + autonomy of non-state actors = *non-reaching state*

Territorial reach + bureaucratic capacity + **no** autonomy of non-state actors = *crony state*

A capable state will be understood as one with the administrative capacity to coordinate civil society's activities, exert political control, and have enough economic resources to keep the state running effectively. An incapable state will be understood as that which doesn't have control over its population and territory in fiscal, institutional, and public force terms. This variable was observed by analyzing the state capacity during the Sudanese wars, Suharto's regime in Indonesia, and Russia's control over the North Caucasus under Yeltsin and Putin's governments. This

² State's capacity to centrally coordinate the society's activities through its own infrastructure.

³ Division of labor between the State's activities, literacy, establishment of weight, measurement and currency policies; communication's speed and transportation.

⁴ Having the political authority and administrative capacity to implement a tributary system with uniform taxes to the national territory.

⁵ Existence of an institutional figure within the national government, which has the authority to regularly monitor the State's finances.

⁶ State's capability to collect enough resources to achieve its political proposals and to invest in public funds in a way that they support the economy's development to eradicate the waste of resources.

⁷ State's capacity to exert control, rule and regulate processes in every territory that makes up the stataal unity.

⁸ State's capacity to exert political control in an autonomous way from non-state actors.

⁹ Professionalized bureaucracy, institutionally capable and resourceful, that can carry out public policies, extraction of resources and securement to access of public goods for the population it rules over.

allowed the identification of the relevance of state fragility in the success of a secessionist movement or under what degree of fragility the state's control can be maintained.

Leadership

This variable was evaluated as dichotomic, which took the value of failed leadership or successful leadership. Young (1991) introduces the term "institutional bargaining," which refers to "efforts on the part of autonomous actors to reach agreement among themselves on the terms of constitutional contracts or interlocking sets of rights and rules that are expected to govern their subsequent interactions" (Young, 1991: p. 282). The author states that the actors that make part of the formulation process of the terms for the constitutional contracts try to devise packages that everyone who's involved can accept. Young focuses on how leaders play a key role in institutional arrangements. He argues that leadership must be approached behaviorally, focusing on individual actions and analyzing how they interact with each other. He identifies structural leaders, entrepreneurial leaders, and intellectual leadership.

Structural leadership is characterized by acting in the name of a particular party engaging in institutional bargaining and who leads by coming up with efficient ways to bring the party's structural power to become leverage over the issue at stake. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial leader can or cannot act in the name of a stakeholder but leads by using negotiation skills to influence how issues are presented in an institutional bargain, which yields benefits for everyone involved. Finally, an intellectual leader may or may not be internationally recognized in the political arena but relies on the power of ideas to shape how participants understand the issues at hand in the context of institutional bargaining.

Helms (2012) conceptualizes leadership by saying that it is agreed upon that "leadership is about giving direction, about guiding others, and about providing solutions to common problems." (Helmes, 2012: p.3). Regardless of this, the author clarifies that leadership is not the same as power. He approaches this issue by regarding soft power and hard power, saying that "whereas hard power relies heavily on the possibility of coercing people, soft power 'co-opts people rather than coerces them' and 'rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others to want what you want.'" (Helmes, 2012: p.3). He also distinguishes, based on James MacGregor Burns' contribution, between transactional and transforming leadership. Transactional leadership corresponds to the focus on the existent values within an organization or society. This type of leadership emphasizes the exchange between leaders and followers.

On the other hand, transforming leadership recognizes the existence of the needs and demands of potential followers. It reaches out to bring change and create higher motivation and morality for both leaders and followers. Friedrich (1961) discusses the power relationship and how leadership plays a role in them. He assures that:

"[...] anything that human beings value can become the basis of a power relationship [...] either because several human beings have to get together and form a group to secure it, or one of several of them possess and can provide something which others would like to have" (Friedrich, 1961: p. 6)

Friedrich also states that a figure of leadership is established if a purpose requires the cooperation of people, given that the power must rest upon one of them.

Under these categories, successful leadership will be defined as a leader who, under Young's categorization, is a structural leader; and that under Helmes' concept is a transformational leader. Holding a structural leadership would imply that individuals succeed in putting their party's interests above everyone else's in an institutional bargaining context. Being a transformational

leader implies that they consider the needs and demands of their followers, which implies that they succeed in providing their people with the completion of their wishes of change.

On the contrary, a failed leadership is characterized by an intellectual leader because they tend to see ideas as a solution to *understanding* the stakes, which would suggest a lack of efficiency in achieving successes for their people. A failed leader can also be understood as a transactional leader. Transactional leadership suggests that a leader appeals to a people's traditions and values to guide their people into maintaining balance. This variable was used to evaluate the leaders of independent countries.

This way, Suharto and al-Bashir's responses to their respective crisis were evaluated and compared to determine what they had in common and how Yeltsin and Putin's governments during the late 1990s had different behavior.

International support

International support was understood as a dichotomic variable, as international recognition or not, based on the constitutive theory of international law. This way, recognition will also be understood as the situation in which the territory that seeks secession has established diplomatic or commercial relationships with a sovereign state of the international system. Recognition will also be understood as any type of support a state gives to territory during its secession process. Thus, non-recognition will be understood as the lack of support for a secession process. This lack of support can be expressed politically in diplomacy and legitimacy or economic commercially or militarily. This variable was used to evaluate the type of support South Sudan, and East Timor received in their secessionist processes, not only in their corresponding region but also worldwide. In addition

to this, through this variable, Islamic groups in Russia and the Middle East have played in Chechnya's secessionist attempts.

ii. METHODOLOGY

Research design

This research will be carried out around a comparative case study design. This type of research seeks to understand a specific phenomenon from a few case studies. Thus, this project seeks to understand secession under a specific context that is the presence of hydrocarbons. This research design uses a contextual analysis of the case studies and conditions to explain the situation. The case studies expand the comprehension of a phenomenon known, which contributes to scientific knowledge. With this in mind, the conditions under which secession was possible in these territories were considered. The historical characteristics in Chechnya were analyzed to see how the presence of oil, and the interaction of the other variables, change the independence dynamic and compare them to the South Sudanese and Timorese cases. As evidenced in state of the art, the literature on secession exists and is extensive, so this work does not have the purpose of studying secession per se but rather the independence processes in countries with hydrocarbons, be it producer or transporter. This dissertation expanded the barriers of knowledge by complementing the literature on secession and the political implications of access to hydrocarbons.

Although this research design does not propose a causal response to the phenomenon of secession in oil states, the objective of this research is not to establish a causal relationship but rather to assess the relevance of hydrocarbons in oil territories that initiate independence processes. On the other hand, this research design supposes a problem of representativeness for the creation

of theories. However, this dissertation proposes a response to this so that only oil states searching for independence in the 21st century are analyzed. Therefore, the cases that have been presented so far can serve to theorize possible future secessionist movements in oil-rich territories.

Method

This research used qualitative methods, given that it considers historical facts rather than experimental ones. Qualitative methods were chosen because historical phenomena are very hardly quantifiable. The comparative historical method was used because, as Mosca states, "the advancements of this discipline (Political Science) depend upon every study of social events, and these events must be taken out from the history of different nations." (Ferrarotti, 1991: p.370). This method uses document analysis to discover similar elements in different contexts. This way, secessionist processes in South Sudan, East Timor, and Chechnya were investigated, given that they have various symmetries. Still, they're not identical, which allows identifying the factors that have made it impossible for Chechnya to achieve independence. The comparative historical method allowed the understanding of oil dynamics in the 21st century. It witnessed the emergence of two petrostates, which permitted a glance at why Chechnya has not become independent.

This research focused primarily on literature about the case studies, especially historical documents, and reports, and provide information on the events that unfolded in Sudan since the 1950s up until the end of the Second Sudanese War in 2005; in Indonesia during the occupation of East Timor until its independence in 2002; and in Russia since the end of the tsarist era, through the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, up until the end of the Second Chechen War. In addition to this, secondary sources were used to define the terms applied in the theoretical framework.

Selection criteria

The 21st century allows this research to locate its findings in the current international arena, which is why this dissertation focuses only on 21st-century petrostates, allowing a further understanding of them and the dynamics that are involved around them. Nowadays, hydrocarbons are the most used energetic source, as they constitute 85% of fossil energy and, given its cheap and efficient character, it represents 1/3 of the global energy consumption. Having control of these resources implies a powerful position within the international system, as they'd play a part in controlling supply and demand. This research was selected because it allows an understanding of oil dynamics and enables the comprehension of power dynamics and its volatility when hydrocarbons are involved.

The similarities found between these cases refer to the territorial distance between the sovereign state and the region seeking independence; and the temporality in which these events occurred since the peak activity of the three movements happened in the 1990s. There is also a similarity in the religious differences of the territories with secessionist intentions, and the availability of hydrocarbons is also taken into account. The differences, on the contrary, refer to how the state and its leaders have responded to these movements, with Russia being a stronger state than Indonesia and Sudan were in the 1990s, having Moscow respond more violently to these independence movements.

South Sudan and East Timor had similar conditions at the time of their independence. They both had a significant availability of energetic resources and had very distinctive cultural differences with the states from which they achieved independence. There was, in each case, a religious minority in the territory in comparison to a significantly bigger majority in the state.

Before independence, South Sudan had a Christian minority compared to the Muslim majority in northern Sudan. The same applies to East Timor, having its people being Christian/Catholic and Indonesia having a vast Muslim majority. Another very relevant symmetry is the condition the states were in before the independence. Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, and Suharto in Indonesia, were both struggling to control their population successfully and alleviate the turbulence that came with secessionist movements due to political unrest. On the other hand, it's also relevant to note that South Sudan and East Timor had very strong international support. South Sudan and East Timor both received major support from the western countries for their claim, giving both their independency efforts legitimacy.

Even though Chechnya does have significant hydrocarbons in its subsoil, its relevance falls onto its strategic geographical position for commerce and trade and its refining capacities. This federal republic is part of the oil-producing regions in Russia, which adds up to Russian oil revenues. Unlike Sudan and Indonesia, Russia has a political system that has allowed its government to have control over their vast territory, having a regional leader for each republic and the military capacity to keep a strong hold in each territory. Contrary to the South Sudanese and Timorese case, Chechnya did not count with significant international support, having most of it vaguely expressed.

III. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

i. SOUTH SUDAN

State capacity and leadership

The emergence of South Sudan as the youngest country in the world resulted from almost 50 years of post-independence conflict in Sudan. During the colonial era, the British government divided Sudan into two regions: North and South, to "stem the spread of epidemic diseases" (Smith, 2011:

171). It was also allowed by the British policies in the South that the North could, in the name of *orientalism*, use a common language (Arabic) and religion (Islam). This division became the root of the civil conflict in Sudan. It created a racial difference between the North and the South, the northerners being Arabs and the southerners being Africans. British rule over Sudanese territories came to an end on January 1, 1956, and with it, a new set of internal issues surfaced. Northern Sudan had a stark advantage over the southern regions of the country, given its cultural consolidation around the Arab world and its proximity to Egypt, which resulted in the stronger region due to its past under the control of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (Cockett, 2016). This allowed the North to violently discriminate against the racial minority in the South, establishing its authority in the search to impose the Arabic culture on the southern territories. The major issue with these severe cultural differences between the North and the South was that the North had no experience nor knowledge of the languages and practices of the people in the South, which caused tensions when it came to the way the nation was going to be built.

The first rebellion on the part of the South began in Torit in August 1955 with a poorly planned mutiny. Nevertheless, other uprisings were happening simultaneously in Kapoeta, Juba, Meridi, and Nzara. More than a secessionist demand, these uprisings had multiple motives, ranging from the unification with Egypt to the delay of the departure of the British (Johnson, 2016). General Ibrahim Abboud's military government targeted civil servants, teachers, and students to spread nationwide the Arab traditions. Political mobilization against the Arabization of southern Sudan began in the 1960s, but it was a slow and not very organized process. In 1963, guerrilla units that called themselves Anyanya started assaulting Sudanese forces, which gained strength after the overthrow of Abboud's military government in 1964. The Arab-Israeli conflict had an important part in the first Sudanese war, given that the Soviet Bloc and the Arabs supported the North. At

the same time, Israel, alongside Uganda, backed the South, which gave Joseph Lago (Anyanya's founder) a strong front in the 1972 negotiations (Johnson, 2016).

The Addis Ababa Agreement represented a halt to the Sudanese conflict. This accord was signed by northern military leader Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry and southern Anyanya leader Joseph Lago in the Ethiopian capital. This agreement

"...granted regional autonomy to the provinces of Southern Sudan. [the agreement] specified the main lines of regional, legislative, judicial and executive authority and traced the parameters of fundamental rights and freedoms, revenue and grants, the terms of the ceasefire, the composition of the army, amnesty, and the resettlement of refugees" (Abusharaf, 2013: 77).

The Agreement faced backlash coming from the South, as leftist opponents believed that the voices of those who suffered the most weren't included in the discussion. Regardless of the intentions of the accord, in 1983, Nimeiry nullified it by declaring Sharia Law¹⁰ under the name of *September Laws*, which meant that the government legalized the marginalization of non-Muslims and non-Arabs. The discovery of oil in 1978 led to creating what was once known as one of the unequal countries in the world. Elites in the North prioritized the needs of the riverside groups between the two Niles. The extraction of oil and its profits were why the country experienced economic and overall developmental growth. Nevertheless, the rest of the national territory was left marginalized and neglected, which served as more a reason for rebellion (D'Agoût, 2013). Nimeiry decreed that the oil that was discovered would not be refined in Bentiu but instead it would be built in Kosti (northern Sudan), and that the product would be exported through Port Sudan, which meant that the oil found in the southern regions was going to be controlled, refined, used, and exported by the North (Salman, 2013).

¹⁰ In its Islamic context, *Sharia* may be defined as the totality of God's commands and exhortations, intended to regulate all aspects of human conduct and guide believers on the path of eternal salvation (Library of the Congress)

Nimeiry's annulment of the Agreement also meant that the southern provincial borders were redrawn. The government of the South was dissolved, strengthening the *otherhood* concept stated since independence, placing the Arabs in the North as the true race (Abusharaf, 2013). This re-division of the southern regions motivated the creation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its respective armed wing Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) by the prominent Dinka ethnic group, whose leader was John Garang. These movements attacked primarily the resources that financed the war on the part of the government, which corresponded specifically to oil and water. Even though Dinka people created these organizations, the recruitment for its functioning happened in both Dinka and Nuer areas (Dreef & Wagner, 2013). Its Manifesto expressed its motive, stating that:

"Voluntary unity in the New Sudan is, therefore, conditioned on creating a political and socio-economic commonality that brings all the Sudanese together as equal citizens in rights and obligations. We must move away from the parameters of the Old Sudan of racism, religious intolerance, historical myopia, and the associated economic collapse, instability, and wars. The Old Sudan has taken us to a dead-end, to the edge of the abyss." (Paragraph III.I.3)

In 1986 elections took place, and Sadiq al-Mahdi's regime was formed as a coalition between the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Immediately after, a meeting between Garang and al-Mahdi took place in Addis Ababa, ending the conflict through negotiations. "Mr. Garang insisted on abolishing the September Laws, which Mr. Al-Mahdi was not willing to do. Mr. Garang argued for a secular democratic state, while Mr. Al-Mahdi stood for an Arab-Islamic one [...]" (Salman, 2013: 375). In 1988, Garang also negotiated the Sudanese Peace Initiative with the DUP's leader, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. This agreement arranged a constitutional conference that promised to freeze the enforcement of the September Laws and a ceasefire in the

civil conflict. Unfortunately, and due to the increasing political pressure on the al-Mahdi's government on the part of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the accord didn't occur, resulting in a military coup al-Mahdi in 1989 and the continuation of the civil war (Salman, 2013).

With the military overthrow of al-Mahdi came the terror reign of the NIF, executing 28 army officers at the beginning of 1990 and establishing and strengthening a holy war against the non-Islamic South to expand the Islamic state all the way into equatorial Africa (Salman, 2013). Nevertheless, the Sudanese government faced internal issues. The NIF broke into two factions: The National Congress Party (NCP) led by President Omar al-Bashir, and the Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Hassan al-Turabi, former leader of the NIF. This power dispute of the North resulted in its demise, as al-Turabi sought to hold absolute power, while al-Bashir realized that the war was unwinnable. The conflict's costs were too high, and the international pressure was overwhelming. In addition to this, the economic situation was continuously worsening, as the Sudanese pound lost more than 90% of its value, and the export of oil was at a halt due to the conflict (Salman, 2013).

In 2002 the Sudanese government entered negotiations with the SPLM, motivated by international pressure and dire economic conditions. The Machakos Protocol of 2002 called the abandonment of *Jihad*, which resulted in the January 2005 acknowledgment of the different ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious characteristics of the southern regions. Under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) supervision and Kenya's government, the NCP and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9 of 2005 (Salman, 2013). The CPA established a transition period of 6 years, in which an interim regime, as the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), had a high degree of autonomy. After these six years, in

January of 2011, a referendum took place on the topic of independence of southern Sudan from the North, in which the overwhelming majority of the people voted in favor of secession and self-determination, which resulted in the emergence of South Sudan as a sovereign country on July 9, 2011 (Dreef & Wagner, 2013).

Hydrocarbons

In 1959 the search for oil in Sudanese soil began in the littoral of the Red Sea and continued through to the 1970s without significant breakthroughs. Nevertheless, in 1974, a US firm, Chevron, began exploring the territories of southern and southwestern Sudan for oil and found success in 1978 (Rone, 2003). The fact that the second civil war erupted five years after oil was discovered in the southern regions was no coincidence, given that Nimeiry redrew the state boundaries to ensure that the North had access to the fields (Patey, 2007). Khartoum's divide and rule tactic proved useful to weaken the Southern movements. This strategy allowed Sudan's government to create a division within the Southern rebels by "granting Arabic herdsmen an unwritten license to pillage and destroy the communities of the Dinka and Nuer African pastoralists of the South [...]" (Patey, 2007: 1001). Regardless, as oil exploration went on and the civil war progressed, these nomad Arab groups, namely Baggara, drove southerners out of Blocks 1, 2, and 4 for foreign companies to continue their work without safety concerns by being "allowed full impunity in Western Upper Nile/Unity State to loot cattle and burn, to kill, injure and capture Nuer and Dinka [...]" (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 51).

In 1984 Chevron's activities in Sudan stopped abruptly as SPLM/A rebels attacked their base in Bentiu and killed four of their employees (DeLancey, 2015). After this, Chevron sold its concession in 1992, when a small Canadian company entered the territory. Arakis purchased

Blocks 1, 2, and 4 in the Western Upper Nile region in 1993, and three years later, they took in China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Malaysia's Petronas as partners. This then left the ownership as follows: 40% to CNPC, 30% to Petronas, 25% to Arakis, and 5% to the Sudanese state-owned oil company, Sudapet, forming the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Corporation (GNPOC). In 1996 Lundin Oil, a Swedish corporation, bought alongside its western partners Block 5A in the Western Upper Nile, in which they held 40.4% of the concession, which were enticed by the prospect of the end of the civil conflict and the possible safe revenue that would come with the activities (Rone, 2003). In October 1998, Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian oil titan, acquired Arakis and its share on GNPOC. As it was a much stronger company, its technological advancements improved the government's revenue by boosting the oil's development. "In August 1999, less than a year after Talisman came on board, the first oil was exported, earning the Sudanese government \$2.2m. Since that time, oil export has amounted to 20-40% of all government revenues." (Rone, 2003: 505)

During the exploration and exploitation of petroleum, the Sudanese government used the road system installed by foreign companies to move the military equipment to reach target villages, profiteering from the control that concessions granted them (Rone, 2003). By the beginning of the 1990s, the SPLM/A had already gained control over most Western Upper Nile, except for regions populated by Bul Nuer, which was deemed a friend to the Sudanese government. Nevertheless, in 1991 the SPLM/A broke into two ethnic factions (Dinka and Nuer), making the SPLM/A a Dinka-led movement and having Nuer leader, Riek Machar, the head of a new group, Sudan People's Defense Forces (SPDF) (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In 1997 the Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed between this Nuer faction and the Sudanese government. This was, non-surprisingly, a façade on the part of the Sudanese government. They needed to demonstrate to the international

community that Sudan was a safe country for oil companies to explore and produce. Still, it also made way for Machar's forces to change its movement's nature and to rename it as South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF).

By June 1999, the GNPOC pipeline that connected Blocks 1 and 2 to the Red Sea was completed, which made Block 5A, adjacent to Block 1, commercially viable and attractive for various corporations. For this reason, the Sudanese government's forces militarized the Block to protect Lundin's drilling location. Nevertheless, at the same time, Machar's SSDF attacked the site without making significant infrastructural damage and only killing 3 Sudanese government employees. After this attack, government forces advanced into SSDF territory, forcing Machar's group to move into Dinka/SPLA territory, giving space for negotiations to join forces to fight the Sudanese government (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

International support

As the Cold War came to an end, the Sudanese relationship with several countries took a shift with the Islamist military coup led by Omar al-Bahir, with the backing of the National Islamist Front in 1989. In addition to this, regional and international conflicts such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998 and the September 11, 2001, attack against the United States strengthened and weakened Sudan's foreign relations with key actors (Shinn, 2015). Historically, Egypt has been the most important neighbor to Sudan. Since its independence, the Sudanese government has had an agreement with Egypt on the control of the waters of the Nile, Egypt's lifeline, in which Sudan had the authorization to use $\frac{1}{4}$ of the river's flow. At the same time, the other three quarters belonged to the Egyptian government, since the two countries have been reluctant about expanding

their share with other Nile Basin countries. Because of this, Egypt showed support for Sudan during the civil war so that there wouldn't be any more countries to dispute the river's rights with.

Nevertheless, in 1995 this relationship took a turn southwards. In 1995, an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa was orchestrated by an Egyptian terrorist group supported by the Sudanese government. Regardless, Egypt maintained a neutral position respecting South Sudan's independence, supporting developmental initiatives (Shinn, 2015). On the other hand, to the northern border, Libya actively supported South Sudan's secessionist movements. Muammar al-Gadhafi provided financial support to the SLPM/A, maintaining close contact with northern opposition figures. Though Libya was a clear ally to South Sudan, it also supported its region by aligning with Sudan to condemn the American aggression in Iraq in 2004 (Shinn, 2015).

Despite its long history with Sudan, Ethiopia was a big supporter of the South Sudanese secession, providing help to its army since its emergence. For a short period, Ethiopia had a cooperative relationship with the Sudanese government. Still, it faded with the rise of the NIF to power and its attempt to spread its ideas. Similarly, Eritrea broke relations with Sudan by 1995 due to the Sudanese efforts to spread Islam across the region. This way, Eritrea strongly supported the SLPM/A, providing Sudanese opposition actors to set a base in Asmara, Eritrea's capital. After the assassination attempt of Egypt's president in Ethiopia's capital, their relationship with Sudan reached a new low, creating the Front-Line States strategy. This tactic was urged by the United States and consisted of the military alliance of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea to put pressure on Khartoum to stop the crisis (Shinn, 2015).

Ugandan-Sudanese ties were constantly severed due to the support they provided to the rebel groups in their respective countries, Kampala supporting the SPLM/A, and Khartoum aiding

Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) against the Ugandan government. Regardless, Sudan was cooperative with Uganda in 2002 to forge diplomatic relations, allowing the Ugandan army to enter South Sudan to track down LRA insurgents. Kenya's stance during the Sudanese civil wars remained neutral, maintaining cordial relations with Sudan while still contacting the SPLM/A. This was also fueled by economic interests, given that Nairobi was the main base for relief operations for South Sudan, which meant that there was constant foreign aid in dollars that flowed through the country. On the other hand, the Kenyan government also held conversations with the SLPM/A to construct railways that connected Juba to a Kenyan port, Mombasa, and construct a pipeline that would allow South Sudanese oil to be exported to the international market (Shinn, 2015).

The Middle East remained a strong religious ally to Sudan as the National Islamist Front took power in the 1990s. It was believed that Iraq provided support for oil exploitation and with weapons to strengthen their military. Similarly, Sudan was loyal to Iraq after the September 2001 attack in New York, strengthening their ties and weakening their relationship with the United States. On the other hand, Iranian-Sudanese relationships weren't always consistent, given Sudan's support to Iraq during the Gulf War. Nevertheless, by 1995, Khartoum expressed their support to Iran on the matter of usage of nuclear energy, which is why, in addition to religious alignment, Sudan became Iran's closest ally in Africa. Sudan's Gulf War support decisions also cost the Sudanese government support from Saudi Arabia. Their political stance played a part in the suspension of grants and concessionary oil sales and their brand of Islamism, which wasn't aligned with Saudi Arabian philosophy (Shinn, 2015).

Asian relations with Sudan had many variants and took different forms. The Chinese government was grateful that Sudan supported them through the criticism of their human-rights

record. In turn, and aligned with their search for foreign oil, China established Sudan as its main source of oil, becoming their most important petroleum partner. Having China's veto backing in the United Nations meant that Sudan had a strong standing within the international community. In addition to this, Sudan benefited militarily from the alliance with China, being provided with equipment such as fighter aircraft and artillery, with heavy investment in arms manufacturing (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

On the other hand, the Soviet Union established close relations with Sudan after its independence. Nonetheless, as the Soviet bloc dissolved in 1991, Russia supported Sudan in the United Nations, condemning American intervention and sanctions. More importantly, Russia became Sudan's biggest arms supplier, in addition to several joint projects for the development of fields such as electricity, mining, and petroleum. Malaysia and India both had important investments in the Sudanese oil fields, having India purchase 25% of Sudan's Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and Malaysia's 30% share. But not only did they take an interest in the energetic resources, but they also actively participated in the training of the army, navy, air force, and refugee resettlement and education programs (Shinn, 2015).

The Western countries had a mainly apprehensive attitude towards Sudan, given its Islamic nature in politics and its support towards what Europeans and Americans considered terrorist groups. The European Union had an active role in humanitarian assistance, which range from conflict resolution and refugee protection to the implementation of the CPA. In addition to this, Britain and France had strong trade links and were big supporters of the peace process that would end the conflict North-South. The United States played a key role in South Sudan's secession, given Sudan's Islamist government and the support it provided Iraq during the Gulf War at the beginning of the 1990s. The American argument was that the Sudanese government had poor

handling of the war with the SPLM/A and the lack of interest in the human rights situation, having allegations of slavery support and no regard for environmental consciousness. After the September 11 of 2001 attack on New York City, the United States focused its foreign policy on countering terrorists. Sudan offered its cooperation, which was seen with a wary eye (Shinn, 2015).

ii. EAST TIMOR

State capacity and leadership

After the Second World War, there was a strong anti-colonial feeling worldwide, with which came Indonesia's independence from the Netherlands in 1949. Nevertheless, these intentions didn't reach the Portuguese occupied East Timor, as they returned to the colonial model of forced labor and underdevelopment, in contrast to their west counterpart, which became part of independent Indonesia (Kingsbury, 2009). Nevertheless, this didn't last long, given the Portuguese 1974 *Carnation Revolution*, motivated by leftist ideas, which aimed to topple the dictatorship and establish a democracy that would enable decolonization. As independence was possible, local activists began preparing and forming the three main political parties, which each followed a possibility for the foreseeable Timorese future. Thirty individuals created the Associação Popular Democrática Timorense [Timor Popular Democratic Association] (APODETI) on May 25 with support of Portugal, Australia, and Indonesia, which favored integration with Indonesia, as it was perceived to reflect anti-colonialism, creating a greater multicultural state.

On the other hand, the group that sought to incorporate the Portuguese symbolisms and power structure named itself the União Democrática Timorense [Timorese Democratic Union] (UDT). The UDT was formed by the political elite active during the Portuguese occupation, such as Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz and Domingo de Oliveira. In addition to these two groups, the

Associação Social-Democrata Timorese [Timorese Social Democratic Association] (ASDT) was founded on May 20. East Timor's main goal was the gradual and eventually complete independence from external powers to create a democratic platform that would allow political, economic, social, and administrative reforms. Nevertheless, as it moved to a more radical position and searching for communist support, the ASDT renamed the party Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente [Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor] (FRETILIN) (Kingsbury, 2009). As the parties started gaining recognition, Indonesia began discrediting FRETILIN as communist and the UDT as neo-fascist, with the clear intention to leave APODETI as the only viable option for East Timor's survival (Dunn, 1996). The last governor of Portuguese Timor insisted on East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia. Still, due to the constant competition between parties, a coalition was presented, to which FRETILIN and UDT agreed, given their refusal to APODETI's condition of incorporation into Indonesia. This coalition was the one that agreed, with the Portuguese government, to a three-year transitional government before East Timor could have complete independence (Kingsbury, 2009). What wasn't known is that Indonesia had already planned to annex East Timor, having the backing of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Hostile information began to be planted among UDT members, which made the coalition collapse by the summer of 1975.

As political unrest began to take place, APODETI members fled to West Timor, presenting their cry for help to Indonesia as that of the people of East Timor. During this, FRETILIN had control of a large portion of the territory and established its military arm of 2,500 indigenous troops and 7,500 militia as Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste [East Timor Defense Force] (FALINTIL) (Kingsbury, 2009). Tensions reached a new high as on November 28, FRETILIN declared independence as the Democratic Republic of East Timor, led by Xavier do Amaral. UDT and

APODETI leaders responded on November 30 with the Balibo Declaration, which claimed integration to Indonesia. This resulted in the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia's military forces on December 7 (Kingsbury, 2009).

At the beginning of Indonesia's occupation, there was a strong radical feeling within FRETILIN and its military, as the party adopted Marxism as its ideology, which strengthened its intolerance of dissent, which then led to violence within the movement in the form of arrests, torture, and public executions of those members of the party who believed in a compromised solution with Indonesia. The first years of the Indonesian occupation were overwhelmingly brutal, having its military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* - TNI) attacking FRETILIN and FALINTIL bases and burning homes and crops to force people into surrender and starvation (CAVR, 2005). These actions were concealed as a resettlement program, having most displaced people suffer mass starvation and regularized torture. The result was the massive fall of East Timor's population, from 653,000 in 1974 to 522,000 in 1979 (Taylor, 1991). The outcome of this crisis was the regrouping of the resistance, with Xanana Gusmão as its elected leader by the Conselho Revolucionaria de Resistência Nacional [National Council for Revolutionary Resistance] (CRRN) in 1981. This resulted in a severe retaliation on the part of the Indonesian military, creating the *fence of legs* campaign, which aimed to force Timorese people into flushing out FALINTIL fighters. In addition, the TNI also committed brutal attacks against the civilian population in the form of mutilation, gang rape, and torture (Kingsbury, 2009). In 1983 a ceasefire was agreed upon with the intervention of the Australian government, but it wasn't very fruitful, as Australia had agreements with Indonesia over certain territories. This ceasefire came to an end in the hands of the Indonesian military general, Benny Murandi, who came up with the Operasi Persatuan [Operation Unity], which sought to deceive FALINTIL into breaking the agreement by attacking

the women of a village in its festival, to which the Timorese responded violently, which unleashed several killings in nearby villages (CAVR, 2005). In 1987, Gusmão withdrew FALINTIN from FRATILIN as a part of his plan to unify the country as one with a single intent. Instead, he transformed the CRRN into a more inclusive organization which he named Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere¹¹ [National Council of Maubere Resistance] (CNRM). This new organization also entailed international recognition. They designated a special commission that aimed to gain solidarity, which meant to send the message that East Timor could deal with all matters at stake. In addition, Gusmão also introduced a 3-phase program that would progressively grant East Timor independence and included talks with Portugal and Indonesia to end the armed conflict, autonomy under the supervision of the United Nations, and complete independence (Kingsbury, 2009).

The Santa Cruz massacre was a turning point for East Timor's secession attempt. On November 12, 1991, the TNI opened fire against 2,000 unarmed mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery in the Timorese capital, Dili, killing more than 270 people. These Timorese people were in the cemetery as a demonstration of support and resistance. Just weeks prior, a protest organizer, Sebastião Gomes, was killed, for who the funeral was planned for November 12. Max Stahl, an activist journalist, filmed the situation, which was smuggled out of the country and shown to the entire international community, bringing East Timor's independence intentions to the light (Kingsbury, 2009).

Indonesia's internal situation was beginning to decline. In 1997 the rupiah lost most of its value on the international market due to nonproductive investment. On the other hand, Suharto's administration was weakening, losing support, and not keeping the economic promises he made. Between 1997 and 1998, the Indonesian rupiah went into free fall, eliminating the middle class

¹¹ Maubere was a term first used during the Portuguese colonial occupation which referred to illiterate people. Nevertheless, the resistance movement began using it to refer to the Timorese people.

and skyrocketing basic foodstuffs price. As a result of the crisis, inflation went up as high as 100%, which, added to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) high interest rates, crumbled Indonesia into a catastrophe (Southgate, 2019). In addition, Suharto's New Order regime collapsed on itself, as there was a poor distribution of wealth, having East Timor as the peak manifestation of the government's excesses. It was clear that it was maintained through repressive means (Kingsbury, 2009). Crumbled by the pressure, Suharto pushed to create a transitional cabinet to give up power. Still, most refused, which is why he resigned from office in May 1998, appointing his vice president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie as his successor. After this transition, the new government approached the World Bank, looking for aid in rebuilding the Indonesian economy, but found complications when it came to the cost of maintaining Indonesia's grip in East Timor. Habibie then proposed a special autonomy situation in which East Timor would still be part of Indonesia. They'd have a certain degree of liberty, and that, if they rejected autonomy, Indonesia would grant independence. On May 5, representatives from Portugal, East Timor, and Indonesia got together and agreed to proceed onto a popular consultation, in which Timorese people would vote for or against the proposal (Kingsbury, 2009). With this new opportunity in sight, the resistance reinvented itself as a national front, alongside the UDT, and adopted a nonpartisan strategy as the Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorese [National Council for Timorese Resistance] (CNRT) with Xanana Gusmão as its president and José Ramos-Horta as vice president. Following Habibie's proposal, the United Nations sent a representative to Dili and, with the UN Security Council, the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to supervise de popular consultation by forming an electoral commission, which registered 450,000 voters both in the country and East Timorese people abroad (Kingsbury, 2009).

General Wiranto of Indonesia's military did not agree with Habibie's proposal, which is why he led TNI-associated militias into unfolding chaos and fear to prevent independence (Kingsbury, 2009). In late 1998, these militias commenced a fear campaign against the Timorese people, using tactics such as burning houses, killing activists, and displacing large numbers of villagers (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Violence escalated the days before the ballot, militias rioting, killing, and destroying in Dili and adjacent districts. Local Timorese could not respond due to the lack of military power and armament. The ballot's results could not be clearer, having a voter turnout of 98,6%, from which 78.5% voted in favor of independence and a mere 21.5% wanting to remain part of Indonesia. Regardless, violence intensified, with the TNI murdering more than 1,400 people and razing more than 70% of the country's environment. These events inspired international action in September 1999, having the Portuguese and American governments urging Australia to intervene in East Timor. By September 20, Australian forces entered the country, with support troops from countries such as Argentina, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sweden, Jordan, and the United Kingdom, among many others. Finally, and after 25 years of occupation, Indonesian soldiers began retreating on October 29, 1999, and the Indonesian flag was hauled down from Timorese territory (Kingsbury, 2009).

Indonesia's impact on East Timor was devastating, even before the 1999 crisis.

"Average life expectancy was just 52 years, around 10 years less than that for the rest of Indonesia, while infant mortality at 149 per 1,000 was among the worst in the world. Its per-capita GDP was \$431, or much less than half of Indonesia's \$1,153, and even this was unequally distributed between indigenous Timorese and Indonesians. Even by Indonesia's already low benchmark for poverty, more than 30 percent of East Timorese lived below the absolute poverty level. Following the

destruction of September 1999, an estimated 80 percent of schools and clinics were destroyed, along with three-quarters of administrative buildings” (Kingsbury, 2009: 78)

These living conditions increased displacement statistics, having people flee the country and cross the border into Indonesia’s West Timor. As transportation means and markets had been burned or destroyed, there wasn’t much left for the Timorese to cling to to maintain a decent living standard. In addition, there were no institutions to work with and not trained personnel to manage them. This chaos led the United Nations to remain in the country to reestablish stability. With this in mind, under the UN Security Council Resolution 12772 of 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was formally created. This proved to be controversial, as there was little consultation on the part of the UN Mission about the way the Timorese wanted to manage their independence and, henceforth, state affairs. Finally, after three years, East Timor became the first sovereign state of the 21st century, having delegates from 90 countries witness their independence on May 20, 2002 (Kingsbury, 2009).

Hydrocarbons

Hydrocarbon exploration in East Timor began as early as the beginning of the 20th century, with the drilling of a well onshore in Aliambata in 1910 and Mata-Hai [Matai] in 1914. Exploration continued through World War II, having crude oil produced from shafts near Aliambata, Pualaca, and Matai under Japanese rule during its occupation from 1942 to 1943. After the War ended, several reconnaissance studies were done in the Timorese territory by companies such as Ultramarino do Petróleo /Shell and Gageonnet and Lemoine for l’Institut Français du Pétrole [French Institute for Petroleum]. In 1956 a new exploration phase began with more than 20 wells being drilled in the Aliambata zone in southwest East Timor. Still, it was motivated by geological

exploration rather than economic interest. In 1974, as independence from Portugal neared, concessions for exploration were granted to the Adobe Oil and Gas of Texas, Oceanic of Denver, and Woodside-Burmah Oil. Only the last one assumed operatorship of the ventures. In 1975 offshore exploration began, with wells in the Mola-1 and Savu-1 region, with significant production potential. Still, it stopped due to the unrest that Indonesia's invasion of the territory brought (Charlton, 2002).

A few years before East Timor's annexation to Indonesia, the government in Jakarta was already negotiating with Australia to define the boundaries of the Timor Sea and how the respective profits would be divided. As the invasion came about, these discussions resulted in the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty (Nicolau & Scheiner, 2005). The treaty was created based on Australia's claim to the Timor Trough, which represented the edge of the Australian continental shelf. Indonesia, on the other hand, claimed the continuous continental shelf that separated Timor and Australia. This way, the two governments agreed on a joint development zone. The treaty covered 60,000 square kilometers and was divided into three sections, labeled as A, B, and C, and was initially intended to last 40 years. Area B, located in the southern part of the cooperation zone, was under absolute Australian jurisdiction. They had to notify Indonesia of any operations and share 16% of all tax revenue from petroleum gains. Area C, in the north, was under Indonesian control and had to notify Australia of any petroleum operations and share 10% of the tax revenue. Area A, located in the center of the Cooperation Zone, was the shared area in which the earnings from petroleum exploitation would be shared 50/50 (Mito, 1998). The treaty came into effect in 1991, but it wouldn't last long, as later that year, the Santa Cruz Massacre occurred, leaving Indonesia's part in the Timor Sea as a beneficiary of blood and violence. This, then, meant that several companies were awarded contracts to explore and exploit the resources. Among these were the

Royal Dutch Shell, Santos, Woodside Petroleum Ltd. (later Woodside Australian Energy), and Phillips Petroleum (later ConocoPhillips), all of which started working in several fields such as Kakatua, Elang, Troubadour, Sunrise, and the rich oil and gas Bayu-Undan field (Nicolau & Scheiner, 2005).

After the consultation that confirmed the Timorese people's desire to secede, oil companies continued to engineer their development plans for the fields. As per the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, "maritime boundaries between nearby states are drawn on the median line, halfway between the coastlines [...] These principles, rather than agreements signed by other nations over illegally occupied territory, establish the new nation's rights." (Nicolau & Scheiner, 2005: 10). Nevertheless, due to East Timor's dire need for revenue to support its crumbling overall infrastructure, on independence day, the Timor Sea Treaty was signed between the Timorese government and Australia, in which it was agreed that they'd share a 50/50 revenue, despite the fact the entire area is on East Timor's side of the median line. Regardless, as time went by and negotiations continued, and international pressure increased, the Timorese shares of the Joint Petroleum Development Area increased to 90%, leaving Australia 10% (Nicolau & Scheiner, 2005).

International support

The Cold War and its regionalized conditions shaped how the international community would react to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and the subsequent secession. Just a few days after the invasion, the United Nations General Assembly introduced Resolution 3485, which viewed Indonesia's military intervention in Portuguese Timor with a condemning eye. Even if the resolution passed with 72 in favor, ten against, and 43 abstentions. The government in Jakarta

faced very little backlash during the invasion and occupation of the territory. Among those abstained were countries such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (Southgate, 2019). Given the United States' defeat in Vietnam, and the communist advance in Southeast Asia in countries such as Cambodia and Laos, Indonesia played a key role in how the Cold War unfolded in the region. This fact was recognized by the western bloc, as was evidenced in a meeting between Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Indonesia's President Suharto in September of 1974, who argued that:

'If Portuguese Timor were to become independent, it would give rise to problems. It [is] not economically viable. It would have to seek the help of another country (...) there [is] a big danger that the communist countries – China or the Soviet Union – might gain the opportunity to intervene.' (Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002: 97)

Nevertheless, as was evidenced in a telegram to the Embassy in Indonesia dated September 20, 1975, the Indonesians had the assurance of Russians of nonintervention. On the Chinese front, there were questions due to the continuous traffic between Timor and Macau, but there were never evident actions that would indicate a communist desire to take East Timor (Southgate, 2019).

Along these lines also lied Australia's alliance with Indonesia. Canberra saw Indonesian security as its own, being the gateway and closest point to Asia. In addition to this, the Australian government also considered the economic implications that stating a political stance would have, in special regard to oil and gas drilling. This was all confirmed by John McCredie, minister in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta: 'Indonesian absorption of Timor makes geopolitical sense. Any other long-term solution would be potentially disruptive of Indonesia and the region [...]' (Southgate, 2019: 39). The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed their

support to Indonesia from invasion to occupation and up until independence. The argument was that if East Timor became independent and develops into a communist stronghold, it would destabilize the region and endanger Southeast Asian security (Southgate, 2019).

Through Indonesia's occupation of the East Timorese territory, the international community shared a very similar stance: it was an internal affair over which only the Indonesian government had decisions. Nevertheless, after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991, Indonesia saw a decrease in arms and military aid flow on the United States. This was not very significant, as the relationship between Washington and Jakarta wouldn't have a drastic change until 1997. Likewise, Australia kept supporting Indonesia, having its Prime Minister Paul Keating affirm in 1994 that "no country is more important to Australia than Indonesia." (Southgate, 2019: 122). Ties between Canberra and Jakarta strengthened after the massacre with the reassurance that Australia would overlook human rights abuses in favor of the bilateral trade and investment deals. This was evidenced by establishing the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum, which was designed to provide a platform to expand economic ties. In addition, in 1995, the government in Jakarta and Canberra signed the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, which committed to consulting matters that affected common security and activities that would enhance both nations' security field (Southgate, 2019).

Furthermore, ASEAN's response to the Santa Cruz Massacre remained aligned with Indonesia. Countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia reject activities or events that would recognize the violence in East Timor. This also implied that the Association was actively on the lookout for supporters of the secessionist movements to apprehend and deport them. This organization's stance was also relevant to other organizations, the European Union (EU). In

December 1996, ASEAN made sure to keep the EU away from the crisis in East Timor to avoid the aggravation of relations between the two (Southgate, 2019).

The situation shifted radically in 1997 with the financial crisis that hit Asia. Indonesia's international economic ties were very strong before the crisis, having US exports triple its profits between 1986 and 1993, and the rapid doubling of profits from Australia's trade deals between 1990 and 1996. To the crisis, the IMF responded with a stringent package of reforms to which Suharto responded hostilely, saying they would not agree. This put in question the Indonesian government and saw the collapse of its domestic support and international backing (Southgate, 2019). As Habibie took on power, international pressure increased.

On the one hand, Indonesia had to deal with cutting the IMF loans amid a financial crisis. Still, on the other, the government in Jakarta had mounting amounts of pressure from the United States and its allies. Even after the Cold War, the United States had a strong interest in Indonesia came to an end. American banks were big lenders and investors in the region. A continuous crisis would impact American imports and exports and the exposure of weaknesses within institutions. In addition to this, the United States also sought the evolution of a strong democracy in Indonesia to strengthen its alliances in the Pacific, specifically in an area in which 40% of ships pass through, which include 80% of Japan's oil supply and 70% of South Korea's (Southgate, 2019). The United States promised military participation in a military coalition with presence in East Timor, alongside Australia and Portugal. It also threatened economic sanctions and the suspension of military cooperation with the TNI. These efforts were also supported by the United Kingdom's halt on Hawk fighter jets sales to Indonesia and the European Union's agreement on their own

arms boycott. Nevertheless, it was made clear to everyone that this support would only happen if Indonesia so allowed it (Martin, 2001).

Asia's response varied greatly. On one part, Japan followed the security situation, sending CIVPOL officers to contribute to the UNAMET. Still, it also carried out private economic threats to Jakarta as Indonesia's leading investor and trading partner. Additionally, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the Philippines announced their willingness to participate in an international effort to intervene in East Timor and urged Jakarta to accept it instead of abiding for possible crimes against humanity. Most Southeast Asian countries still expressed their support to Indonesia, encouraging understanding and sympathy to the international community during the political transition, but were left alone as the September 11 Security Council session demonstrated international outrage and Indonesia's isolation (Martin, 2001). As was finally agreed by Jakarta, the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was created in late September 1999 and composed of forces from countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Thailand, Italy, South Korea, and Brazil among many others who aided in various forms. The assistance came in repatriation, financial aid, and military confrontation with the remaining TNI combatants (Cotton, 2000).

iii. CHECHNYA

State capacity and leadership

Chechnya's search for independence has had a long run, dating back to the tsarist era in Russia. During Romanov's autocracy, the Russian Empire sought to conquer the North Caucasus region from 1816 to 1856, when it finally achieved the Chechen subdual (Meno & Fuller, 2000). As the tsarist regime collapsed in 1917, a year later, on May 11 of 1918, Chechnya, alongside Ingushetia

and Dagestan, formally proclaimed the independence of the Northern Caucasus as the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus (Kosok, 1955). Regardless, with the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, the Bolsheviks managed to take back control of the region, increasing the measures to keep it under their jurisdiction. During the Second World War, after Operation Barbarossa¹², entire nationalities of the Northern Caucasus, among which were the Chechens, were accused of conspiring with the Germans and sent to Central Asia. Still, more than 205,000 of the 618,000 people who were deported died on the road or were killed by the Soviets (Menon & Fuller, 2000). Stalin devised a territorial division in which multiethnic republics were created to control the region, disregarding the national unity before the USSR. This directly affected the 1950s ethnic violence in the Northern Caucasus, as the exiled returned to their lands, only to find other ethnic groups occupying those (Menon & Fuller, 2000).

The USSR collapsed under Gorbachev's leadership, especially with his perestroika¹³ and glasnost¹⁴ reforms. It brought long-standing issues among its republics regarding national self-asserting concerning the USSR's federal nature of unity. These animosities resulted in nationwide turbulences, which stemmed from political reforms, sovereignty for the republics, or independence. Chechnya joined these demands and declared state sovereignty as the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on November 27, 1990, with Dzhokhar Dudayev as the national movement leader elected president October 27 of 1991. On November 1, after recognizing the Russian Federation as the USSR's successor, Chechnya declared secession from the USSR (Lapidus, 1998).

¹² Invasion of Russia by Nazi Germany in June 1941.

¹³ Economic and political restructuring.

¹⁴ Openness and democratization.

After the dissolution from the USSR, Russia was left to deal with several issues both internally and with the ex-soviet republics. Initially, it's important to note the crippling fear for the disintegration of Russia itself if secessions were granted all over, which made Moscow adopt more severe measures to keep control of the territory it could control. After the collapse of the Soviet system, there was ambiguity over the federal system, which was evident in the refusal to sign the 1992 Federal Treaty and the 1993 Constitution. There was an evident lack of institutionalization, which led to confusion and unrest among the republics (Lapidus, 1998). From 1992 to 1994, there was a tense environment between Moscow and Grozny. The Chechen economy began to deteriorate, which the Russian Federation exploited to delegitimize Dudayev's rule. These two years also saw the collaboration between Chechen criminal groups and Moscow to profit from the trafficking of weapons, oil, and drugs, facilitated by the unrest seen between the two territories. By 1994, Yeltsin's government had hardened its policies on internal economics, the West and the near abroad, referred to as the Caucasus. This meant that Moscow would finance and support opposition groups in Chechnya that would assassinate or overthrow Dudayev (Lapidus, 1998). During 1994 there was an escalation to the conflict, having Moscow concoct exaggerated reports of how Chechnya sought to expel Russia from the Caucasus and how Dudayev wanted to incorporate the entire region into the Chechen territory. Yeltsin's government-supported Umar Avturkhanov, who was the head of the Chechen Provisional Council. This set the scene for several attempts to overthrow Dudayev's government. Still, as they all failed, the Russian government in Moscow decided on November 29, 1994, to shift from covert military action to an overtone, utilizing Russian military forces and starting the First Chechen War (Lapidus, 1998).

As December 1994 began, the Russian military launched airstrikes against the Chechen territory, and more than 23,000 Russian troops, accompanied by 80 tanks and 200 armored

vehicles, and entered Chechnya, assaulting the capital on December 31 (Malko, 2015). The first six months of the intense war saw combat between Russian and Chechen combatants, having only until on April 11, 1995, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) intervened to promote a peaceful resolution and stabilization of the situation. This dynamic went on until the summer when the crisis escalated after the Chechen raid of the Russian town of Budyonnovsk. On June 15, Chechen forces seized the local hospital, taking a thousand hostages, threatening Yeltsin for the recognition of independence, and the Russian military to withdraw from the territory. This situation resulted in a failed operation on the part of elite Russian troops and heavy losses on both sides but was ultimately resolved by the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who negotiated the release of the surviving hostages in exchange for safe passage to Shamil Basayev, recognized leader in the Chechen movement, back to Chechnya (Malko, 2015). From July 1995 to May 1996, Moscow negotiated with Grozny to agree on the Chechen situation. After a cease-fire was agreed on July 31, 1995, and the public announcement by Yeltsin on March 31, 1996, of the plan to settle the issues with Chechnya, Chechen president Dudayev was killed in a rocket attack on April 21, 1996, having his deputy Zelimkhan Yandariev take over. A settlement was reached on May 27, 1996, namely the Khasavyurt Accord. Even though neither wanted to give in to the other's demands, it stated the halt of military actions in Chechnya and the withdrawal of Russian forces by August (Malko, 2015).

Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on January 27, 1997, and was recognized by Moscow. Regardless, the status of Chechnya and its place regarding the Russian Federation was still unclear. By March, Russia's Parliament agreed on amnesty for most of the Chechen fighters. Two months later, the Treaty on Peace and Principles for Mutual Relations was signed by Maskhadov and Yeltsin. This agreement, which was made

based on the norms of international law, stipulated that both Russia and Chechnya would not resort to the threat of force to resolve possible differences that would arise (Malko, 2015).

Nevertheless, Maskhadov's government was soon weakened by the increasing violence abetted by criminal gangs and warlords. Between 1997 and 1999 was marked by rampant criminality, taking of hostages, severe violence, and attacks on foreign workers. These actions were strongly instigated and supported by extremist groups and Shamil Basayev, who had lost to Maskhadov in the 1997 presidential elections. In addition to this, Islamist extremists had set up training camps for aspiring jihadists, in which there was political and religious indoctrination, in addition to military training (Kramer, 2005). By 1998 Maskhadov had lost much of the control of the territory, and his character was losing credibility after multiple assassination attempts. As a result of Islamist pressure, Maskhadov imposed Sharia law throughout Chechnya at the beginning of 1999, which was seen with disapproving eyes, strengthening the extremists' motive. In addition to this, Basayev, alongside the extremist leader of Saudi origin, Hattab, raided Dagestan to set up a Wahhabist¹⁵ state in the Caucasus, claiming Holy War. Seeing the inability of Chechnya's leader to control the situation, Moscow sent forces to drive the guerrillas out of Dagestan. This was only the beginning of Russian intervention. Russia attributed five publicized bombings to Chechens, which resulted in the death of almost 300 people and the wounding of more than 2,000 in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk. The new Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, responded by giving the order to the Russian army to reassert control over the Chechen territory by all means (Kramer, 2005).

On September 18, 1999, Moscow dispatched troops to the North Caucasus and bombed guerrilla positions in the Chechen territory, especially those that were next to Dagestan. In addition

¹⁵ Fundamentalist Islam.

to this, soldiers were also sent to “set up a cordon along the 650-kilometer border with Chechnya to isolate the republic from the rest of Russia” (Malko, 2015: 48). More than 100,000 Russian soldiers were deployed in Chechnya, which had 1650 tanks and 480 rocket artillery systems (Malek, 2009). In response to this, Basayev threatened to attack several Russian cities with Islamic suicide bombers, which were rumored to be financed by Islamic extremists overseas, including Osama bin Laden, who had a relationship with Basayev dating back to 1994. On October 1st, the Russian troops advanced on the ground from Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Stavropol to seize control over the northern part of Chechnya. There was concern in the European Union about the abuse of power and force that the Russian military was exerting, regardless of the recognition of the Russian sovereignty. Nevertheless, Putin stated that it was a Russian domestic matter but was welcoming foreign aid to the more than 100,000 Chechen refugees. Regardless of Chechnya’s attempt to raise international attention to the human rights situation by approaching NATO, Russia refused a third party’s participation in the negotiations (Malko, 2015).

By the beginning of the year 2000, the Russian forces had already taken control of Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, while still having a firm grip on most of Chechnya’s territory, controlling its most important towns. Because of this, Putin gained large public acclaim, which strengthened his position as Yeltsin’s successor, becoming the most important governmental figure in Russia’s political arena. As the year went on, Chechen guerrillas were forced to move southwards, seeing Russian troops flooding the north, but were still able to weaken the Russians in two specific attacks in which Chechens killed more than a hundred Russian combatants. In Moscow, Putin’s rivals were pushing for negotiations with Grozny. Still, Putin’s tough tactic, with the promise to eliminate all ‘terrorists and bandits,’ seemed to gain the popular vote on the March 2000 presidential elections with 53% of the vote (Kramer, 2005).

Since June 2000, the Russian military limited its offense. It was ordered to maintain control in urban areas, eliminate or isolate guerrillas, and prevent suicide bombing attacks and hostage-taking to restoring normal life in Chechnya. This was all made while attempting a consolidation of long-term military presence. A pro-Russian government was being bolstered, led by Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, who was later assassinated in May of 2004 (Kramer, 2005). By 2002 Russia's forces were composed of:

“The 42nd Motorized Army Division (15,000 troops); battalions from various military precincts (22,000); paratroopers (3,000); the 46th MVD Brigade (10,000); OMON units from all over Russia, as well as the SOBR rapid reaction force (together 4,000); border troops (6,000); and the FSB. In addition, there were special forces units from the FSB, GRU, and MVD (“Alfa,” “Vypmel,” “Vitjas,” “Skif,” “Fakel,” etc.), as well as railroad troops, units of the Ministry for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense, construction troops, and so on. In sum, the Russian troops in Chechnya amounted to approximately 100,000 men”. (Malek, 2009: 89)

All through the year 2002, the conflict between Moscow and Grozny increased with multiple bombings and suicide bombers. Among these was the Moscow theater siege on October 23, Chechen rebels took eight hundred hostages and demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces, which resulted in the death of 129 hostages and Putin's regard of the event as one of the largest terrorist attacks. As Chechen rebels were acting violently in various places, and with no clear objective or leadership, Moscow regarded the independence movement as failed and thus non-existent, which then, after the theater siege, drove Putin to declare that Russia was not willing to sign any peace treaty with Chechnya, as was previously done in 1996 (Malko, 2015).

By 2003, Putin stated that Chechnya would have broader autonomy while staying within Russia's political structure. Thus, as promised on December 12, 2002, a referendum was held on

March 23, 2003, on constitutional affairs and elections. As a result, and despite the Chechen rebels' threat of disruption, 95% of the 540,000 eligible voters approved the drafting of a constitution that fell into the framework of Chechnya being an integral part of the Russian Federation (Malko, 2015). It was announced on March 5 that the Russian troops were to gradually halt the counterterrorist actions, furthering the maintenance of the public order agenda. This went on for several years after Moscow delegated some military operations to local pro-Russian Chechen troops. Even though separatist groups sought to boycott the new constitution, it went into action in April of 2003. (Kramer, 2005).

Hydrocarbons

Oil exploration in the region of the North Caucasus began at the end of the XIX century, with the discovery of oil fields in Eastern Ciscaucasia, especially in three zones: Terek-Bragunsky, Sunzha-Grozny, and the Black Mountains that went from the Vladikavkaz railway to the coast of the Caspian Sea. It was such the magnitude that by 1914 oil coming from the North Caucasus made up 14% of all Russian oil production (Empric, 2002). By 1915 the drilling had begun west of Grozny, in Mozdok, and later, the first industrial oil flows were obtained. From the 1920s up until the 1960s, several studies were done to assess the hydrocarbon potential that the region had. Among those involved in these works were companies such as Malgobekneft and Grozneftegeofizika (Kusova, 2019). Before the dawn of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus oil industry was being developed by various companies from Belgium, Germany, and the Russian empire, and by 1939 the fields in Chechen-Ingushetia territory produced around 4 million tons of crude oil per year (Vatchagaev, 2008).

It is important to note that Chechnya's refining facilities had an aggregated capacity of 20 million tons and could process any crude, making it a valuable spot. Under Leonid Brezhnev, in 1971, Chechnya's refineries reached their peak, processing 21.3 million tons of crude oil, which amounted to more than 7% of the USSR's total production, including a portion of the Baku oil fields. Regardless, this didn't last long, as refineries in Baku were upgraded, and new facilities were being constructed elsewhere in the nation. By 1980 the production of oil in Chechen-Ingushetia shrank to 7.4 million tons, and five years later, that number declined to 5.3 million tons (Vatchagaev, 2008). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya's petroleum industry was of interest to many due to its geopolitical relevance and refining capacity. This interest was demonstrated during the First Chechen War, as the Russian troops were careful not to damage any petroleum industry sites, including the drilling and refineries. Regardless, as the Second Chechen War began, Putin was clear to make the refineries their first targets (Vatchagaev, 2008).

Chechnya's relevance also lied in the key position it had in a pipeline network. Grozny lied in the center of the pipelines that reached four key points: Kazakhstan, Siberia, Azerbaijan, and Russia's Black Sea port, Novorossiysk. Two of the three branches of the pipeline that connect Novorossiysk passed through Chechen territory, which carried oil from Baku, Azerbaijan and natural gas from Turkmenistan. These pipelines had an economic attractive to them, as the transit was low cost and would reduce export costs, making it key to international investors (Ashour, 2004).

In 1996, as the First Chechen War came to an end, an agreement was reached between Azerbaijan's state oil company (SOCAR) and Russia's state-owned Transneft. The transportation contract defined that a portion of the Azeri oil would be transported to the Black Sea through

Russia (Makara, 2010). After the First Chechen War, discussions between Grozny and Moscow about the oil situation were tense. There was a clear disagreement on what the transit fees paid to Chechnya would be. Due to the separatist threat, Moscow began hinting that there would be an alternative route to avoid Chechen territory altogether. Threats were being thrown back and forth between the two parts, having Chechnya also say that they'd build a pipeline to Georgia to exclude Moscow from the deal. On September 9, 1997, an agreement was signed between Grozny and Moscow that stated that Russia vowed to repair the Chechen portion of the pipeline. Still, it was not effective, as separatist groups bombed the truck that carried the Russian workers to repair the pipeline. As a response, Boris Nemtsov, Russia's fuel and energy minister announced on September 15 that the Russian government had decided to construct a 283-kilometer pipeline that would go across Dagestan to North Ossetia, to cut off Chechnya of all Russian oil affairs in the Caspian Sea (Evangelista, 2002).

International support

The international reaction to the crisis in Chechnya was deeply marked by the recent end of the Second World War and the Cold War, but also highly influenced by the United States' fight against terrorism. The American reaction to the situation varied significantly in both wars. The Clinton administration maintained a restrained opinion, stating that it was a Russian internal matter that didn't concern Washington. Nevertheless, in 1995 the United States officially criticized how the Russian government handled the situation, denouncing the human rights violations and the infringement of the OSCE guidelines, which required a forty-eight-hour notification of more than 9.000 troops or large tanks (Malko, 2015). The response to the Second Chechen War varied entirely, as the Chechen attacks on the Russian population in 1999 brought sympathy from various

countries to Moscow. Though the international community didn't largely support Chechnya's secession, Clinton's administration regarded the violence against Chechen's under Putin's orders as ethnic cleansing, which was, since the Second World War, a topic that raised concerns and anguish for everyone. As the Bush administration settled, the initial response to the Chechen issue was similar to Clinton's, even meeting with Chechen leaders to assess the situation. But with the September 11, 2001, attack on New York, Washington shifted its perspective entirely. Bush accepted the Russian definition of the war against terrorism, which meant that the previous discussions with Chechen representatives came to an immediate halt, supporting Russia's territorial integrity argument (Malko, 2015).

The reaction in Western Europe has tough since the beginning. The European states argued that, even if they respected Russia's territorial sovereignty and affirmed that Chechnya was a part of Russia, the human rights violations were unacceptable. The European Union used economic pressures to cancel a partnership accord between the EU and Russia, which were notably supported by Scandinavian countries (Cornell, 1999). The government in Copenhagen suspended an agreement on bilateral military cooperation and expressed their support for sanctions, refusing to ratify the EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Russian government. The Norwegian and Swedish governments supported the sanctions against Moscow, expressing their concerns through the Nordic Council (Kazio, 1996).

Eastern Europe and the former soviet republics saw Russia's invasion of Chechnya as the Russian attempt to restore the status and borders of the former Soviet Union, rejecting a pro-Western policy. Therefore, these states strongly supported the Chechen movement, with the slogan promoted by the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) in a condemning attempt to stop Russia: "Today Grozny, tomorrow Kyiv, and the next day Warsaw" (Kuzio, 1996: 106). It was

also widely accepted among Eastern Europe that the Chechen movement was wrongly regarded as separatist, assuring that the Chechens never acceded to Russia. Strong supporters of the secessionist attempts were Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. They issued letters to the Russian government denouncing its brutality against Chechens while officially recognizing Chechnya's right to self-determination. In addition to this, evidence was found of citizens from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Poland, Belarus, and Azerbaijan fighting alongside Chechens. Still, it was thought that the Azeri support was not official, as the supporters were, according to the government in Baku, mostly isolated groups (Cornell, 1999).

The Islamic world denounced Russian brutality, having the popular opinion support much more loudly the Chechen cause. The two most affected countries were Iran and Turkey, as they both had a border with the Transcaucasia. Turkey's Grey Wolves group¹⁶ strongly lobbied for the Turkish recognition of Chechnya, insisting on the supplying of arms to the Chechen movement. All in all, Turkey's support to Chechnya could be regarded as discrete, as Grozny had an unofficial embassy in a nearby villa on the Bosphorus and the alleged supply of aid and technology to the Chechens by Ankara. This also posed a problem for the Turkish government. It couldn't openly support Chechnya, having its own internal Kurdish separatist issues, which is why it could not adhere to a pro-independence policy (Cornell, 1999). Iran was also silent on the issue, even though it was pressured to support the Muslim community in Chechnya. Regardless, after the Cold War, Teheran has had very close ties to Moscow for various economic interest which were put above their religious motives. For one, Iran and Russia had a strategic concern in keeping Turkey's influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. They also had agreements on the joint exploitation of oil and gas resources. In addition, Moscow has constantly supplied Iran with materials and

¹⁶ Ultranationalist, Islamic group in Turkey.

personnel for their nuclear program, making Russia one of the only countries to hold amicable relations with Iran. Other Muslim countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, or Pakistan, have demonstrated their support to Chechnya but lacked the resources or position to help them in their cause. Different from this was Saudi Arabia, who donated funds to the Chechen movement, denouncing Russia's continuous violence against Muslims, which has on various occasions severed ties with the Muslim world (Cornell, 1999).

IV. HYDROCARBONS' RELEVANCE IN SECESSIONIST PROCESSES

The South Sudanese case presents a very interesting illustration of what comes in handy to secede successfully. The South Sudanese pro-independence movement had control of hydrocarbons, both territorially and in terms of sovereignty. The SPLM/A drove companies out of the country with the constant violent combats with the Sudanese army. A prime example of this would be Chevron's withdrawal from the territory in 1984 after the attack on the site, even if it was the first to explore Sudanese oil potential. Regardless, this situation did change during the conflict. In 1997, taking advantage of the ethnic division of the southern separatist movement, Khartoum forces were using the sites' infrastructure to attack them. By 1999 the panorama shifted again due to the infringement of the Khartoum Peace Agreement on the part of the Sudanese government, which allowed the Dinka SPLM/A and the Nuer SPDF to join forces and attacking the GNPOC pipeline. This meant the continuation of the war, which undermined Khartoum's claim of a safe environment for oil exploitation, once again driving oil companies out of the country. This also meant that the South was gaining legitimacy to its case for the oil in southern soil, making it have official sovereignty with the signing of the CPA.

As the evidence proves, Sudan was an incapable state throughout the crisis. Due to its colonial legacy, the North and the South had a clear division. The government in Khartoum didn't know the southern traditions, focusing only on the northern Arab culture. This happened in 1955 with the first expression of the southern wish to secede, all the way to the breaking of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983, with the imposition of Sharia Law. This meant that Sudan had virtually no control over the coordination of the civil society's activities due to the lack of cohesion within the country and its peoples. In addition to this, Khartoum did not have economic stability during the last years of the crisis, which must be considered when defining why South Sudan could secede. Sudan unevenly distributed the revenues and industry of southern oil, creating even further division, which contributed to the economic crisis of late 1990, when the Sudanese pound lost 90% of its value. Moreover, the government in Khartoum couldn't exert political control, having al-Mahdi fail to negotiate with the SPLM/A in the late 1980s and the political dispute between al-Turabi and al-Bashir within the NIF.

On the other hand, al-Bashir's leadership was a successful one since he rose to power. As a transformational leader, he considered the dire economic situation Sudan was facing and decided to negotiate with the SPLM/A to end the war. Al-Bashir furthered the NIF's Islam project with certain South regions while still prioritizing the Sudanese people's wellbeing. As the international reaction varied, it is impossible to determine a specific stance on how backed the South Sudanese secessionist movement was by the international community. Regardless, the evidence shows that the government in Khartoum had the support of Islamic countries. In contrast, the South Sudanese movement had the backing of their African neighbors and the western countries.

The Timorese cases must be analyzed differently as there is a stark difference in how the aspects studied in the variables behaved before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The people

of East Timor didn't have control of their hydrocarbons during both Portuguese and Indonesian occupation. During the Portuguese occupation, Western companies made the first drillings and concessions, while during the Indonesian occupation, Canberra and Jakarta had control over the sites. The resources were unreachable for the Timorese under foreign occupation. As the Asian crisis came, so did the sovereign claim of the Timorese hydrocarbon potential, having Australia switch the Timor Sea Treaty from Indonesia to Dili, and the ability for the Timorese government to assign concessions under their discretion.

On the other hand, it was found that Indonesia was a capable state until the financial crisis of 1997. The government in Jakarta successfully commanded its troops to coordinate East Timor's civil society activities rather quickly, having the civil population surrender due to the violent ways the TNI was abusing. The opposition of FALINTIN was also quickly taken under control due to the much bigger military capacity and infrastructure, allowing control of the country. Additionally, Indonesia had very amicable trade relations with its regional neighbors and the western world, which meant it had the resources to control the island and access its resources. On the other hand, before 1997, Suharto's regime was never questioned and was able to control the Timorese people, successfully exerting control. Regardless, the financial crisis dismantled this strength and made Indonesia an incapable state. For one, in Indonesia, there was major political unrest due to the collapse of the New Order, making the Indonesian government unable to control societal activities. In addition, after the crisis, maintaining East Timor became too expensive, which Jakarta couldn't afford considering that the inflation went up by 100% and the rupiah plummeted. This was also why Habibie easily gave East Timor the possibility to secede, failing to exert Indonesian control.

Suharto's leadership was successful, considering the economic boom during its regime and how he maintained fruitful relations with powerful countries. Nevertheless, after 1997, he sought

his salvation, ignore the Indonesians' needs by quitting and appointing a successor without giving it much thought. On the contrary, Habibie's leadership type was successful. He sought to save Indonesia from a deeper crisis by giving in to international pressure, giving up on the annexation of East Timor.

As well, international support shifted quickly after the 1997 financial crisis. Before, the world turned a blind eye towards the situation in East Timor, regarding it as an Indonesian internal affair. There was also a strong feeling that East Timor was not strong enough to survive on its own, making powerful countries such as the United States, Australia, and several European countries disregard the issues. Regardless, as the financial crisis occurred, Jakarta's response to the solutions proposed by western institutions made the international community doubt Suharto's competence to maintain power. Western powers also had a strong interest in Indonesia's economic stability, as it was a stronghold for transportation and trade. This resulted in the international support of the Timorese secessionist efforts by providing support through UNAMET and INTERFET.

Chechnya's long history of secessionist attempts makes it a particularly interesting case. Chechens didn't have control of hydrocarbons, either during the Soviet or the post-Soviet era. There were always Russian companies in charge of exploration and exploitation. The Chechen movement closest to hold control of hydrocarbons was the 1997 attempt to damage the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which resulted in the rerouting of the pipeline, making Chechnya practically lose its relevance in the hydrocarbon industry. Additionally, there was no sign of sovereign claim over the hydrocarbons in the Chechen territory, as the deals were made with Moscow, and there was no clear support for Chechnya's intervention in the industry.

During the Chechen wars, Russia remained a strong, capable state, having it grow stronger under Putin's regime. There was an overall military capacity to control the Chechen territory, and,

before Putin, Moscow was involved in Chechen politics, supporting Avturkhanov as a key part of the regional government. Nevertheless, by the time the Second Chechen War erupted, the Russian troops got hold of the Chechen territory. At the same time, Maskhadov's government weakened, giving Russia more reason to believe Chechnya couldn't stand on its own, giving a legitimate reason to keep it under Moscow's jurisdiction. Additionally, the Russian ruble remained stable through the wars, and Chechnya remained economically dependent on Moscow, making Russia financially viable and Chechnya's independence unattainable. A stark difference was also present in how the Russian government exerted political control, having Yeltsin willing to negotiate and Putin's refusal, instead, using a strong military strategy to dissipate the crisis.

As was previously mentioned, Yeltsin's approach to the Chechen attempts was very different from Putin's. It was found that Yeltsin was an unsuccessful leader, as he demonstrated Russian weakness by giving in to the Chechen demands during the 1995 hostage situation, failing to display the Russian military strength. On the contrary, Putin was able to keep Russia's territorial integrity while keeping Chechnya and solving the crisis with a strong hand.

International support to the Chechen movement can be reduced to sympathy without action. The United States, both Eastern and Western Europe, and the Islamic world all condemned human rights abuses perpetrated by Russian forces in Chechnya but didn't take significant action against it. Having economic and strategic interests, or fear of Russia's response, most countries didn't legitimately express their support to Chechnya, all regarding the wars as an internal Russian issue.

Several similarities and differences can be pointed out, having already established how the variables were expressed in each case. South Sudan had both types of control, while East Timor only had sovereign control, and Chechnya had neither. As was evidenced, having territorial control over hydrocarbons can play an important role in a successful secession. Still, the Timorese case

demonstrated that the real control of energetic resources that counts is the sovereign one. This means that control is an important condition, but a petrostate does not need it to achieve secession.

On the other hand, it is interesting to see how state capacity shifts depending on the international ambiance and how the economy is behaving. Both South Sudan and East Timor's capability to face the crisis significantly decreased with the devaluation of their currency and the economic crisis that it brought onto their nations. Therefore, these two cases were similar because they did not have to resources or legitimacy to keep the seceded territories. Contrarily, Russia, as the logical successor of the Soviet Union, had at its disposal large military resources, making it capable of withstanding Chechen's attacks and rebel actions with its force control.

It was observed that the leadership variable didn't behave as was initially expected. It was initially thought that an unsuccessful leadership would lead to secession. Still, as was seen in the South Sudanese and Timorese cases, both al-Bashir and Habibie were successful leaders when making decisions for their national, majoritarian population. Sudan and Indonesia didn't have a fruitful outcome to their attempts of spreading their culture onto South Sudan and East Timor, which was why they focused on their people. On the contrary, it was seen that Yeltsin's unsuccessful leadership could have led to possible Chechen secession. Still, as Putin rose to power, he emphasized that he put the Russian interests and integrity over peaceful negotiations.

International support was the key to a successful secession, especially if that support comes from western powers. As was seen in South Sudan and East Timor, the United States and European countries backed their claim for self-determination, while only regional, Islamic countries supported Sudan and Indonesia. This is interesting because it reflects the power that western values and traditions hold within the international community. The South Sudanese case demonstrated

that the United States would back the non-Muslim group, as Islam was associated with terrorism in the Middle East, which strongly went against American foreign policy. In addition, the Timorese case also demonstrated similar behavior under different circumstances, having the western world support East Timor and its non-Muslim population for the sake of Indonesia's economy.

On the other hand, the support shown to the Chechen separatist movement was virtually insignificant, only having the backing of some Eastern European states whose support was mostly diplomatic. Western countries were interested in maintaining an amicable relationship with Russia due to the American policy of fighting against terrorism. Even the Islamic world didn't show significant support, regardless of the cultural aspects that were thought to be key to expressing international support.

Having taken this evidence and analysis into account, this research came to find that, for a territory with access to hydrocarbons to secede, there needs to be international support to provide sovereignty to the new nation. Having international backing would allow the territory to have legitimate control over its resources and its economic effects. The part that state capacity and leadership play is more volatile, as the behavior of the international community or the hydrocarbon industry determine how capable a state is to respond to an independentist movement, or how a leader deals with the crisis because that would enable legitimate economic and military intervention in a territory.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation aimed to understand under four variables how important hydrocarbons are to a successful secessionist movement in territories with hydrocarbon availability in the 21st century, and its findings respond to the question. Having control of hydrocarbons is a relevant but not

necessary condition for a territory to secede. Instead, the necessary condition is international support. It allows credibility with the international community for its economic future and possible trade partners. It also creates a viable source of income for the country to survive without international intervention. Additionally, the state can strengthen its strategic position within the international arena, making it a key player.

Political Science aims to understand power dynamics in various scenarios, understanding political processes, institutions, diplomacy, theories, strategy, and ideologies, which is why this thesis is relevant to contribute to its knowledge. This research explored how the control of resources molds the international community and how individual interests are shaped through time and economic behavior. This dissertation also provides the basis for further studies about possible independences of feasible petrostates in the future, which comes to be relevant with how the world currently perceives the importance of energy production and consumption. In addition, it can also be interesting to explore how these energy dynamics will shift with the introduction of other sources of energy, and what would happen with these possible new states and what type of power they would hold.

Intending to further this research, it's possible to explore it adding a governmental variable and how the type of government allows or forbids secession. These three cases had a different approach to the type of government under which the leader ruled. In Sudan, Omar al-Bashir rose to power through a military coup against Nimeiry; in Indonesia, Suharto was elected president in 1967, but transitioned to an authoritarian state through his New Order policy; and in Russia, Putin reached power as acting president, appointed by Yeltsin, but was later democratically elected in 2001, after serving as prime minister in 1999. Possible future case studies could include the province of Cabinda in Angola and Alberta in Canada. It has been seen that these two territories

seek secession but haven't had any major advancements. This research made it possible to conclude that hydrocarbons are still a key resource for a country to hold power. The insertion of a new country with this type of resource comes with a complex set of conditions and particularities that enable their emergence.

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