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dc.rights.licenseAl consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.
dc.contributor.authorCabra-Acela, Pedro A.
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-16T13:44:49Z
dc.date.available2021-07-16T13:44:49Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/50296
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I examine the conditions under which rewarding honest taxpayers is an optimal mechanism to reduce tax evasion and improve collection. My theoretical model suggests that when it is expensive to audit contributors, and moral (or pecuniary) evasion cost is high enough, rewarding tax compliance is an effective strategy to increase collection. I provide empirical evidence from Argentina's province variation of rewards policies and tax collection. Where the data suggests that theoretical conditions hold, I find a positive effect in real estate per capita tax collection between 0.4 and more than 2 standard deviations.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.format.extent50 páginas
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos CEDE No. 30 Julio de 2021
dc.titleRewarding good taxpayers, an effective mechanism?
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo
dc.identifier.eissn1657-7191
dc.subject.keywordTax evasion
dc.subject.keywordGood taxpayer
dc.subject.keywordRewards
dc.subject.keywordFiscal policy
dc.subject.keywordArgentina
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dc.provenance.unitFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.jelH21, H26, H30


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